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I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to allocate income tax liabilities properly, a tax must be 
imposed at the correct time. An unwarranted deferral of tax results 
in the permanent undertaxation of transactions, while unwar-
ranted acceleration has an opposite and equally inaccurate effect. 
Under the current taxing regime, the most significant determinant 
of the timing of taxation is the classification of a receipt as one 
entitled to the pattern of taxation applicable to debt rather than 
the pattern applicable to income. Accordingly, the timing, and thus 
the accuracy, of taxation is largely controlled by how "debt"· is de-
fined for income tax purposes. 
This classification issue is one of the most pervasive problems in 
our current income tax scheme. The benefits of the pattern for 
taxing debt are claimed not only for conventional loans, but also 
for such diverse transactions as security deposits, advance pay-
ments for goods and services, and obligations to incur future costs, 
As a result, an incorrect understanding of what should be treated 
as debt for income tax purposes can produce inaccurate taxation 
on an extensive scale. However, despite the need for a clear and 
workable definition of debt, the income tax rules contain two fun-
damentally inconsistent approaches to the problem. Neither of the 
approaches is correct. In large part, the failure to properly define 
debt is attributable to disagreement and confusion over the man-
ner in which the income tax rules should reflect time value of 
money principles. 1 
' For useful discussions of the seemingly self-evident proposition that a dollar in the fu-
ture is worth less than a dollar today, see Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Defer-
ral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722, 725-728 (1990); Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 Tax 
L. Rev. 1, 10-18 (1986). 
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Any claim that a receipt ought to be subject to the pattern of 
taxation applicable to debt is necessarily based upon the recipient 
having an obligation to incur an economic cost in the future that 
offsets the accretion to wealth otherwise generated by the receipt. 
Accordingly, whether a receipt is to be treated as debt for income 
tax purposes is determined, not by reference to the receipt as such, 
but by the effect given to that future obligation at the time the 
receipt is obtained. Debt is· defined, therefore, by the extent to 
which obligations to incur future costs are recognized as offsetting 
the value of a receipt. 
The judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, traditionally has de-
fined debt solely by reference to the quality of the obligation to 
repay the receipt. 2 This approach does not take into account the 
time value of money, and requires fully recognizing, or fully ignor-
ing, the repayment obligation. Congress and the Treasury Depart-
ment, on the other hand, have over the past decade developed a 
new definition of debt that is primarily based upon the time value 
of money and generally requires recognizing only a portion of the 
repayment obligation, while treating the balance as additional in-
terest. 3 In the wake of these legislative developments, it has been · 
suggested that all or portions of the congressional definition of 
debt should be judicially adopted in a variety of contexts.• How-
ever,· in two recently decided cases, United States u. Hughes 
Properties, Inc. 5 and Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light 
• See generally Popkin, The Taxation of Borrowing, 56 Ind. L. J. 43, 49c65 (1980). 
• That definition is embodied in I.R.C. § 7872. See also I.R.C. §§ 483, 467 and 1274. These 
statutory definitions are not by their terms comprehensive. Rather, they serve to limit what 
otherwise would be treated as debt for income tax purposes, and thus presuppose a prior 
determination that the transaction involves an extension of credit. However, the sections are 
intended to apply to transactions that might not be treated as loans under the judicial defi-
nition of debt. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20, 
1985). 
• To date, this approach has generally been rejected. For example, in Follender v. Com-
missioner, 89 T.C. 943 (1987), the government argued that the amount borrowed for pur-
poses of the § 465 at-risk rules should be limited to the present value of the repayment 
obligation. The court, however, concluded that the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") did not 
require consideration of the time value of money in making that computation. See also 
Pritchett v. Co~missioner, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987). However, in Pleasant Summit Land 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260 (1989), the 
court allowed the taxpayer a basis for property equal to its market value notwithstanding 
the fact that it was subject to a non-recourse debt in a greater amount. For a critique of that 
decision, see Johnson, The Front End of the Crane Rule, 47 Tax Notes 593 (Apr. 30, 1990) . 
• 476 u.s. 593 (1986). 
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Co.,6 the Supreme Court firmly rejected the congressional ap-
proach and reaffirmed its allegiance to a definition of debt that 
ignores the time value of money. Completing the mosaic, in one 
significant instance Congress rejected its own definition of debt 
and sought to blend time value of money considerations with the 
traditional judicial approach. 7 
This article will examine a variety of contexts in which these in-
consistent approaches to the recognition of repayment obligations 
appear.8 While elements of each approach should be preserved, 
this article will. argue that neither the judicial nor the congres-
sional scheme appropriately imports time value of money princi-
ples into the taxing system. Debt simply cannot be defined prop-
erly without reference to the time value of money. In that respect, 
· the judicial approach is fatally defective and continues to result in 
the inaccurate taxation of a wide range of transactions. Moreover, 
while the congressional bifurcation approach to debt may appear 
to be more accurate in measuring the real economic gain realized 
by borrowers at the time the transaction is initiated,9 this in fact is 
not the case. The implementation of time value of money concepts 
does not require, or justify, the creation of fictitious interest 
through the bifurcation of a single repayment obligation. The con-
gressional approach is based upon a false analogy to discounted 
• 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990). In the lower court proceedings, the United States Tax Court, 88 
T.C. 964 (1987), ruled that the taxpayer, a utility company, properly excluded certain cus-
tomer deposits from gross income. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 857 F.2d 1162, 
1163 (7th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. For other treatments of 
this case, see Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-free Security or Prepaid Income?, 41 U. Fla. 
L. Rev. 773 (1989); Burke & Friel, Tax-free Security: Reflections on Indianapolis Power & 
Light, 12 Rev. Tax'n. Indiv. 157 (1988). 
7 See I.R.C. § 461(h); infra text accompanying notes 116-22. 
• The issue considered here is the proper timing of the inclusion or exclusion of an item 
from income. The question of what should be treated as debt can arise in a very different 
context. For example, the troublesome question of whether an investment in a corporation 
should be treated as debt or as stock normally raises issues concerning the double taxation 
of corporate profits rather than the timing of taxation. These other issues are not considered 
herein. An obligation that would be treated as debt under the principles developed here 
might, quite consistently, be treated as something else for other purposes of the taxing 
system. 
• The perception that the congressional approach is superior is the primary source of 
pressure on the judiciary to incorporate the congressional definition of debt. See Illinois 
Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1986), in which Judge Posner refers 
to taxation based upon the present value of a receipt as "analytically sounder" than taxa-
tion based upon the likelihood of repayment. 
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debt and does not produce a result that is consistent with the prin-
ciples of income taxation. In fact, receipts that are wholly interest-
free can be taxed correctly only under the ali-or-nothing approach 
of the judiciary, applied with due regard to the significance of the 
time value of money. Accordingly, the congressional experiment 
with the bifurcation of non-interest bearing repayment obliga-
tions10 should be terminated, instead of being extended to other 
forms of obligations to incur future costs, as some commentators 
have urged. 11 
After examining the judicial and congressional definitions of 
debt, Part II of this article will demonstrate the consistencies and 
inconsistencies of both approaches vis-a-vis the principles of an in-
come tax. That exploration provides a basis for developing, in Part 
Ill, a correct and uniform definition of debt and a superior ap-
proach to the taxation of obligations bearing below-market rates of 
interest. The proposed approach to the taxation of debt would not 
only correctly reflect the time value of money, but would also ma-
terially simplify the resolution of numerous classification issues 
surrounding debt.12 
Part IV will demonstrate how the principles developed in Part 
III can be applied not only to conventional loans, but also to such 
quasi-loan transactions as advance payments and obligations to in-
cur future costs. Part V emamines the significance of l)Ot repaying 
the receipt and shows that the congressional bifurcation approach 
to debt aggravates existing inadequacies in the taxation of debt 
cancellations. Part VI will demonstrate the proper implementation 
of the new definition of debt proposed in Part III. Part VII argues 
that the imperfections in the current taxation of debt are not off-
•• Receipts that are offset by repayment obligations that bear a below-market rate of 
interest must be bifurcated to be taxed correctly, but not in the manner presently required. 
See infra text accompanying notes 145-52. 
11 See Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44 Tax 
Notes 1531 (Sept. 25, 1989); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Ba-
sic Principles Revised, 38 Tax Notes 831 (Feb. 22, 1988); Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a 
'Reverse Investment', 26 Tax Notes 925 (Mar. 4, 1985). 
•• While the point is not developed here, the traditional judicial approach to the defini-
tion of debt, which relies primarily on an open-ended facts and circumstances analysis, is 
highly complex to administer. See, e.g., Robertson, Daughtrey & Burckel, Debt or Equity? 
An Empirical Analysis of Tax Court Classification During the Period 1955-1987, 47 Tax 
Notes 707 (May 7, 1990); Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid In-
come?, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 773 (1989). Classification based upon the financial analysis sug-
gested here would be far easier to administer. 
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set by the "surrogate" taxation of the other party to the transac-
tion. This section also examines revenue loss attributable to the 
flawed approach to debt currently in use. Part VIII illustrates how 
the bifurcation approach contained in section 787213 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code ("Code") is inconsistent with a number of long-
standing tax rules. 
II. THE CoNFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF DEBT 
A. The Judicial Test 
One of the most recent statements describing the judicial ap-
proach to defining debt can be found in the unanimous decision of 
the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power.14 The factual setting 
for Indianapolis Power is particularly significant in that it de-
scribes a situation that is quite commonplace. The taxpayer, a 
public utility furnishing electric power, required approximately 
five percent of its customers to make cash deposits, in an amount 
that could not exceed two months' billings, to secure the payment 
of the customers' utility bills. 15 Interest at six percent was only 
paid on deposits held for more than one year.16 The deposits were 
refunded to customers who established their creditworthiness by, 
among other methods, the timely payment of bills for nine 
months.17 For that reason, the refund of deposits was normally by 
cash or check, although a customer could request that the refund 
be credited to his bill.18 However, when a refund was made because 
of a termination of service, the· refund was normally applied 
against the customer's final bill, although the customer could de-
mand repayment by cash or check.19 Depending upon the year, be-
tween fifty-seven and sixty-nine percent of refunds were accom-
plished by a credit to the customer's bill.2° Refunds of deposits 
th~t remained unclaimed after seven years escheated to the State 
•• All references to "section - " in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
as amended, unless otherwise noted. 
•• See supra note 6. 
•• 110 S. Ct. at 590-91. 
•• ld. at 591. 
" Id. 
18 ld. 
"Id. 
•• Indianapolis Power, 88 T.C. at 969. 
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of Indiana. 21 
During the years at issue in Indianapolis Power, the total 
amount of deposits held by the utility taxpayer averaged about 
$1,000,000. That amount was not segregated by the taxpayer, but 
instead became a part of its operating funds. 22 Thus, the taxpayer 
had permanent possession of an unrestricted fund of $1,000,000 for 
which it paid a rate of interest that, quite likely, was well below its 
cost of other capital. 23 For income tax purposes, the taxpayer 
treated these receipts as "deposits" subject to the pattern of taxa-
tion applicable to loans. The Commissioner treated the entire 
amount of the deposits as taxable income when received. 
In an opinion by Judge Flaum, the Seventh Circuit24 r~solved 
the dispute by exploring whether the taxpayer had obtained the 
economic benefits associated with a permanent receipt or the bene-
fits associated with obtaining the proceeds of a loan. Because the 
taxpayer was required to pay interest on the receipt in an amount 
that the courts assumed, perhaps erroneously, approximated a 
market rate of interest, the court concluded that the taxpayer had 
only obtained the economic benefits of a loan. Thus, the court al-
lowed the taxpayer to exclude all of the deposits from income. 26 
While the issue was not before it, the court plainly indicated that, 
had interest not been paid on the deposit, the deposit would have 
been taxed in full because then the taxpayer would have obtained 
the greater economic benefits of an item of income. 26 
The Supreme Court, while affirming the Seventh Circuit, viewed 
the matter quite differently. Initially, the Court denied that a basis 
existed for distinguishing between the economic benefits of income 
and the benefits of loans. 27 While noting that the court below 
viewed the payment of interest as significant, the Court declined to 
discuss the relevance of interest payments. Rather, in line with its 
prior decisions, the Court held that the critical factor in determin-
ing whether the deposit should be subject to tax was the degree to 
11 110 S. Ct. at 591. 
•• ld. 
•• ld. at 592. 
•• 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988). 
•• Id. at 1168 . 
•• ld. 
17 110 S. Ct. at 593. 
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which the taxpayer controlled the receipt. 28 
Under the tests for income first set forth in the Supreme Court's 
1955 ruling in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 29 receipts over 
which "taxpayers have complete dominion" constitute taxable in-
come, while receipts subject to "an obligation to repay" do not. 
Thus, the key to the decision in Indianapolis Power was whether 
the taxpayer had "some guarantee that he will be allowed to keep 
the money."30 Since concededly the customers of the taxpayer were 
legally entitled to demand the_ ultimate return of their deposits (al-
though generally they did not), the Court easily concluded that the 
deposits were not subject to tax. 31 As a result, the entire principal 
amount of the security deposits became subject to the pattern of 
taxation applicable to debt. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power was 
entirely consistent with its earlier income tax decisions. 32 In these 
earlier cases, the question of taxation was resolved solely by refer-
ence to the taxpayer's legal entitlement to retain the principal 
amount of the receipt. If the obligation to repay the receipt was 
merely a contingent obligation that depended upon future events, 
the obligation might be ignored entirely and the entire receipt sub-
ject to tax. Thus, in North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet,33 the 
taxpayer was deemed to have obtained possession of a cash pay-
ment in 1917 even though its entitlement to the payment remained 
in dispute until 1922, when the litigation against the United States 
was resolved. The Court held that the entire amount of the pay-
ment constituted income in 1917 because the taxpayer had ac-
quired the requisite control over the payment. 34 The justices gave 
no effect to the value of the contingent liability to repay the 
amount, in the event the taxpayer lost the later litigation. On the 
other hand, if the receipt were subject to a fixed obligation to re- · 
pay its face amount, it could not be subject to tax regardless of the 
likelihood of repayment or the actual value of the repayment 
obligation. 
18 ld . 
•• 348 u.s. 426 (1955). 
•• 110 S. Ct. at 593. 
" ld. at 596. 
11 See infra notes 33-7 and accompanying text . 
•• 286 u.s. 417 (1932). 
" ld. at 423-24. 
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The rigidity of the Court's historic position has on occasion pro-
duced embarrassment and minor doctrinal modification. In Com-
missioner v. Wilcox, 36 for example, the Court concluded that an 
embezzler could not be subject to tax on his ill-gotten gain because 
of the obligation to repay his employer - an obligation that 
seemed unlikely to be honored. The Court, of course, was ulti-
mately required to disown that impractical result, but it did so in a 
manner that preserved its general approach to the definition of 
debt. To accomplish the taxation of illegally obtained receipts, in 
James v. United States36 the Court modified its definition of re-
payment obligations entitled to recognition to require a "consen-
sual recognition" of the obligation by the taxpayer.37 However, the 
decision in James was consistent with the decisions in North 
American Oil and Wilcox in either wholly including or wholly ex-
cluding the receipt from income, and in attributing no further sig-
nificance to the probability or value of repayment. · 
A similar approach has characterized other recent Supreme 
Court demarcations of the line between income and loans (or 
quasi-loans). Just three years prior to the decision in Indianapolis 
Power, in Hughes Properties38 the Court had permitted a taxpayer 
to exclude receipts from income to the extent that these amounts 
were subsequently payable to the patrons of its slot machines, even 
though these repayment obligations were deferred for an unknown 
period of time. The Court noted that the government had argued 
that the present tax benefit ignored "the time value of money" but 
the Court declined to even examine the merits of that assertion. 39 
Similarly, in Commissioner v. Tufts'0 the Court treated the face 
amount of a non-recourse debt as entitled to recognition as debt, 
even though the value of the encumbered property, and thus the 
value of the obligation to repay the debt, was a vastly smaller sum. 
The judicial approach to the definition of debt thus consists of 
•• 327 u.s. 404 (1946) . 
•• 366 u.s. 213 (1961). 
•• ld. at 219. 
63 See supra note 5. 
•• 476 U.S. at 604. While the Supreme Court certainly assumes the responsibility for its 
own decisions, a significant share of the blame for the decision in Hughes Properties rests 
with the government. The government's attempt to justify using time value of money princi-
ples was so weak and inept as to lack any persuasive power. See, e.g., Brief for the United 
States, p. 31. 
•• 461 u.s. 300 (1983). 
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two distinct, albeit related, principles. On the one hand, the value 
of a repayment obligation is· relevant only in the sense that the 
likelihood of repayment affects the value of the obligation and de-
termines whether the obligation will be recognized. Once the court 
has concluded that the obligation is sufficiently fixed to warrant 
recognition, the actual value of the repayment obligation, and thus 
the time value of money, becomes wholly irrelevant. On the other 
hand, debt is an "aU-or-nothing" proposition."1 If the repayment 
obligation is entitled to recognition, the receipt may be offset by 
the entire face amount of the obligation. If the receipt is not enti-
tled to recognition, then no amount of the obligation may offset 
the taxation of the receipt.· 
B. The Congressional Test 
Beginning in 1964, Congress began to develop a definition of 
debt distinct from that employed by the Supreme Court.'2 The 
congressional definition emerged from, and was shaped by, a pro-
cess that began with a very different objective than that of the 
courts. As a general proposition, under our income tax laws income 
derived from different sources has been subjected to substantially 
different rates of tax. Ordinary recurring income has been subject 
to the generally applicable marginal rates of tax, which at times 
have been quite substantial, while gain from the disposition of 
property held for investment purposes has been eligible for the 
special, and far lower, rate of tax imposed upon capital gains."3 
During most years in which the income tax has been imposed, 
therefore, taxpayers had a considerable incentive to disguise ordi-
nary receipts, such as interest, as gain from the sale of a capital 
asset. Thus, for example, rather than sell an asset for a note in the 
amount of $1,000, maturing in two years and bearing a market rate 
of interest of 10%, a taxpayer might purport to sell the asset for 
$1,210, payable in two years, and treat that full amount as gain 
from the sale. · 
During the early years of the income tax laws, taxpayers were 
., Cf. Popkin, supra note 2, at 46. 
· •• See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
•• For a useful summary of the relationship between the ordinary and capital gains rates 
of tax, see Brinner & Munnell, Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation and Other Problems, 
New Eng. Econ. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 3. 
1991] Redefining Debt 597 
not required to charge interest on deferred payments or character-
ize any portion of a deferred receipt as interest." Eventually, Con-
gress became aware of the tax avoidance potential of concealed in-
terest payments and in 1964 enacted section 483 of the Code'11 to 
address the matter. Under section 483, if a sale of property for de-
ferred payments did not provide an adequate stated rate of inter-
est, then a portion of the selling price would be recharacterized as 
unstated interest. 
In arriving at its result, section 483 required the bifurcation of 
the sale proceeds by identifying and taxing separately an amount 
that represented interest on the deferred payment. 46 That interest 
component was identified by first computing the present value of 
all payments to be made under the contract of sale, using a pre-
scribed interest rate. 47 That computed amount presumably repre-
sented the price for which the property would be sold in an arm's 
length transaction for an immediate cash payment; the amount 
would also represent the principal amount of a note that .would 
have been issued in exchange for the property if the note bore 
stated interest at the prescribed rate. Accordingly, only that com-
puted principal amount of the deferred payment was to be treated 
as the proceeds from the sale of the property, and thus made eligi-
ble for the rate of taxation applicable to capital gains. 48 
Scheduled note payments that exceeded the computed present 
value of the repayment obligation were characterized as compensa-
tion to the seller for deferring the receipt of the sale proceeds."9 
This amount was not treated as additional gain from the sale, and 
therefore was characterized as interest. Under section 483, it is so 
characterized for all tax purposes.110 With refinements reflecting 
the continuing sophistication of the Treasury Department in mea-
suring the time value of money,111 the basic pattern of section 483 
•• See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Kingsford Co. v. Commissioner, 41 
T.C. 646 (1964). 
•• Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224(a) (1964). 
•• See I.R.C. § 483(a). 
47 Under current law, the interest rate used is the "applicable federal rate" determined 
under I.R.C. § 1274(d). · 
•• See H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 72-74 (1963), 1964-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 125, 
332-35 (1963). 
•• See I.R.C. § 483(a)-(b). 
00 See I.R.C. § 483(a). 
•• Under § 1274, which today applies to larger sales of property for a deferred payment, 
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continues to serve as the Code method for identifying the element 
of interest in sales for deferred payments. 
While section 483 had long addressed the issue of identifying in-
terest upon the transfer of property for a deferred payment, no 
provision of the Code addressed the related question in the context 
of a transfer of cash for a deferred repayment. In that statutory 
vacuum, taxpayers began to realize the tax advantages of making 
"interest-free" loans.112 The government's attempt to persuade the 
courts to find an element of interest in such transactions met with 
no success until the issue finally reached the Supreme Court in 
1984.113 Although not addressing the rather messy- but ultimately 
unavoidable - issue of valuation, in Dickman v. Commissioner~~' 
the Court approved in principle the treatment of the foregone in-
terest in an interest-free loan as taxable for gift tax purposes. 
While it seemed certain that the principle of Dickman would be 
extended to income taxation, Congress was determined to avoid 
that lengthy and uncertain process, and enacted section 7872 in 
the same year.1111 
Under section 7872, a cash receipt purporting to be the proceeds 
of a loan is divided into two portions: one portion treated as a loan 
for income tax purposes, and the other treated as a functionally 
unrelated payment, 116 the tax consequences of which are dependent 
upon the relationship between the borrower and the lender.117 In 
common with section 483, the portion of the receipt that is to be 
treated as the principal amount of a loan, and thus excluded from 
the computed interest is treated as original issue discount and is subject to the rules of 
§ 1272. Thus, interest must be accrued annually, regardless of when paid, and is accrued 
using principles. of compound interest. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3). 
•• High bracket parents, for example, wishing to shift the tax consequences of the receipt 
of investment income to their lower bracket children could do so through the making of an 
interest-free loan to the children that could then be invested by them. Similarly, the share-
holders of closely held corporations wishing to withdraw cash without immediate tax conse-
quences could do so through loans. The failure to charge interest on such a loan would avoid 
the counter-productive return of cash (and taxable income) to the corporation. 
•• See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Dean v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) . 
.. 465 u.s. 330 (1984). 
•• Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 172(a) (1984). For a comprehensive analysis of § 7872, see Lok-
ken, supra note 1, at 200-51. 
.. See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1). 
•• Thus, for example, the unrelated payment may be a non-taxable gift or contribution to 
the capital of a corporation. It could also be taxable compensation or a dividend. 
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income, is determined by computing the present value of the re-
payment obligation using a prescribed rate of interest that repre-
sents a pre-tax market rate of return.'18 The excess of the receipt 
over that computed amount is treated as an unrelated payment 
(either taxable income or a gift). 119 The amount payable on the ma-
turity of the loan in excess of the amount treated as the principal 
of the loan represents the interest that would have been paid on an 
arm's length loan,60 and is so treated for all purposes of the Code. 
The amount treated as interest will equal the amount initially 
treated as being other than the proceeds of a loan.61 
Section 7872 thus consists of several distinct elements. First and 
foremost, the amount taxed (or remaining untaxed) is determined 
by reference to value rather than face amount. Second, ·in applica-
tion of that principle, a portion of the initial receipt is recharacter-
ized so as not to be treated as the proceeds of. a loan, and thus is 
normally taxable. Third, an equivalent portion of the repayment 
obligation is recharacterized as interest, rather than principal, and 
thus is normally made deductible. The net effect of the application 
of section 7872, therefore, is to impose a tax on a portion of an 
interest-free receipt that is subsequently offset by the grant of a 
deduction for an identical amount. 
Section 7872 does not, of course, alter the underlying economic 
arrangement of the parties. The total amount received by the 
lender will not exceed the amount originally transferred. The inter-
est created by bifurcating the receipt is entirely artificial; economi-
cally the transaction remains interest-free. While similar in form to 
section 483, section 7872 thus plays a very different role. The ear-
lier provision was designed to identify an interest component that 
was thought to exist but to have been concealed; section 7872, by 
contrast, was designed to create an element of interest that clearly 
did not exist before. 
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(0(1)-(2). The test rate is derived from taxable federal obligations 
having maturities similar to the maturity of the loan in issue. See I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(a)-(b),(e). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7872 (a)-(b). 
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(a)-(b). For example, if the applicable federal rate were 10%, the pre-
sent value of a six year, $10,000 loan would be $5,640.' Thus, the initial unrelated payment 
would be $4,360. If the $10,000 were repaid at maturity, out of that amount $4,360 would be 
treated as interest. In this example and all examples used in this article, present value is 
determined by compounding annually. Under§ 7872, however, compounding must be semi-
annual. 
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With the adoption of section 7872 in 1984, therefore, the bifurca-
tion analysis that earlier had been employed by section 483 to dis-
tinguish interest from sale proceeds evolved into a definition of the 
amount of a receipt that would be treated as a loan.62 Indeed, in 
the extension of the principles of section 483 that are presently 
embodied in section 1274, the computation of the present values of 
payments to be made is characterized as resulting in the "imputed 
principal amount" of the deferred payment. 63 Thus, the process 
begun in section 483 has today evolved into a congressionally 
adopted bifurcation approach to the definition of debt. 
III. THE CoRRECT DEFINITION oF DEBT 
A. The Structure of I nco me Taxation: A Framework for 
Analysis · 
A system of taxation consists of an array of sub-systems that 
prescribe different rules for the taxation of different transactions. 
For a correct burden of taxation to be achieved, transactions must 
be assigned correctly to the sub-system that governs the taxation 
of that form of transaction. Just as a personal residence will not be 
taxed correctly if it is classified, for example, as a hospital, likewise 
a loan will not be correctly taxed if it is classified as a form of 
income. The most important sub-systems, for purposes of this arti-
cle, are those that control the timing of the taxation of receipts 
and those that specify the pattern for taxing debt and income. 
The primary rules imposed by these sub-systems are well under-
stood, even though their full implications frequently are not appre-
ciated. Because an income tax is only imposed upon a gain or in-
crease,64 the receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not taxable.611 The 
•• The first use of the bifurcation approach to define debt appeared in regulations pro-
posed under § 385 which authorized the Treasury to issue regulations distinguishing be-
tween stock and debt. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(a), (b)(1)(ii) (1980). In an adaptation of 
§ 483, the regulations limited the maximum amount of the investment characterizable as 
debt to the present value of the repayment obligation of the ·purported debt security, rather 
than the face amount of the security. The excess over that amount was classified as an 
equity investment. While that regulation was ultimately withdrawn, its bifurcation analysis 
was subsequently codified in § 7872 and in the extension of § 483 contained in § 1274. 
•• See I.R.C. § ·1274(b)(1) . 
.. The classic theoretical definition of income is the sum of the taxpayer's consumption 
and net change in wealth between two points in time. See, e.g., Simons, Personal Income 
Taxation, p. 50 (1938). 
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receipt is offset by the obligation to repay the loan and thus the 
transaction does not result in gain. What "obligation to repay" 
means is, of course, the main focus of this article. Similarly, to the 
extent that the repayment of a loan is regarded as the mere return 
of the original amount borrowed, the repayment does not produce 
income tax consequences.66 However, to the extent that the pay-
ment is treated as a payment of interest to compensate the lender 
for the· use of the loan proceeds, then it is deductible (subject, of 
course, to an increasing list of exceptions).67 
On the other hand, if the proceeds of a loan are in fact not re-
paid by the borrower, the transaction will result in an increase in 
net worth and· that gain will become taxable at the time the offset-
ting liability is discharged.68 For income tax purposes, the transac-
tion is viewed as if the borrower first obtained an economic receipt 
equal to the amount of the indebtedness forgiven, and then later 
used that (constructive). receipt to repay the loan.69 The income 
tax consequences of this constructive receipt and qisbursement 
parallel the consequences of an actual receipt and disbursement. 
Thus, the receipt will be taxable only if an actual receipt would 
have been taxable.70 Meanwhile, the disbursement will have no tax 
consequences to the extent it constitutes a repayment of principal, 
although it may be deductible if it represents a payment of 
interest.71 · 
By contrast, if a receipt is treated as taxable income when re-
ceived, because the existence of an offsetting obligation was un-
known or disregarded, the receipt will be subject to immediate tax-
•• See generally Popkin, supra note 2, at 43. 
" See Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1413-1414 (9th Cir. 1986). 
•• The deduction is generally allowed by § 163(a), buti it is subject to numerous limita-
tions. These include § 265(a)(2) (allocable to tax-exempt income), § 163(d) (investment in-
terest), and § 163(h) (personal interest). , 
88 See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1931); Treas. Reg.§ 1.61-12(a). 
•• See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938); Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 
223, 236 (1977). 
•• If, for example, the cancellation is a gift, no tax is imposed. See Helvering v. American 
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943). 
71 See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1947). Under current law this result is 
achieved by not taxing the cancellation of a liability, the payment of which would be de-
ductible. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(2). The net effect of this provision is the same as if the income 
were taxed, but the constructive payment of the liability deducted. Compare I.R.C 
§ 108(e)(2) with I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A)(i) and Coven, Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht, 
Section 357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income, 58 Or. L. Rev 61, 66-67 (1979). 
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ation. However, if the previously taxed receipt actually must be 
repaid, that repayment will be deductible when made.72 
These primary rules for the sub-systems governing the taxation 
of debt and income can thus be seen to be rules of timing as much 
as they are rules of inclusion or exclusion. If the receipt is retained, 
the borrower ultimately will be subject to tax on the amount of the 
receipt, regardless of how the receipt was initially treated. If the 
receipt is not retained, the borrower will not be taxed on that 
amount, again, regardless of the initial treatment. Thus, the net 
effect of the initial assignment of a transaction to the sub-system 
for taxing debt or the sub-system for taxing income is not to in-
clude or exclude a receipt from income, but rather to control the 
timing of when increases in wealth are taxed. 
While the primary impact of the sub-system assignment of a 
transaction may be upon the timing of a receipt's taxation, that 
assignment nonetheless will have a material effect upon the overall 
burden of taxation imposed. The significance of that timing effect, 
and thus the propriety of assigning a transaction to the sub-system 
for taxing debt or income, is best seen through illustration.73 
CASE ONE 
Abbie, a key employee of Distributor, Inc., has obtained a $10,000 
loan from Distributor, giving in exchange her personal note. The 
note matures in six years and bears interest at a market rate of 
10o/~, payable annually. However, at Abbie's option, the note can at 
any time be applied to reduce outstanding accounts receivable due 
Abbie for the Distributor's purchase of goods from her. Both Abbie 
and Distributor are subject to a marginal rate of tax of 30%, and 
both can earn a 10% pre-tax return on their investments. 
Under current law, of course, this transaction would be governed 
by the bifurcation approach of section 7872.74 Absent that section, 
however, the consequences of the transaction would be controlled 
by the definition of debt employed by the Supreme Court. Because 
71 See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); I.R.C. § 1341; Dubroff, The Claim of 
Right Doctrine, 40 Tax L. Rev. 729, 747-55 (1985). 
78 Note that this case illustration, along with others that appear later on, can also be 
found in an appendix to this article. This is provided so as to facilitate cross-referencing in 
passages that demand a review of the case descriptions. 
74 See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B). Section 7872 also contains a series of de minimis exceptions 
to its application that are ignored herein. See I.R.C. §§ 7872(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)(1). 
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of Abbie's control over the principal of the receipt, under the latter 
approach the receipt might be treated as income when Abbie re-
ceives it, notwithstanding the market rate of interest paid by Ab-
bie while the note remained outstanding. It is important to under-
stand exactly why this characterization of the transaction would 
produce an incorrect result. 
Because the repayment obligation bears a market rate of inter-
est,711 the present value of the obligation is equal to the amount of 
the receipt.76 Accordingly, Abbie's transaction has not produced an 
economic gain and, under the principles of income taxation, should 
not be subject to tax, at least not in year 1. That result is achieved 
by fully recognizing her repayment obligation in year 1, and thus 
assigning the receipt to the sub-system for taxing debt. 
The importance of not taxing Abbie on her receipt (that is, on 
an amount greater than her actual increase in net worth) can be 
demonstrated by an examination of the after-tax economic conse-
quences of the transaction. If Abbie reinvests the receipt, obtaining 
a market rate of return, and ultimately repays the loan, the overall 
transaction will produce neither a net gain nor a loss; Abbie will 
return or pay over to the lender principal and interest precisely 
equal to the amount she receives. Since the transaction does not 
change her economic position, there is simply no occasion for the 
imposition of tax. Accordingly, no net income tax burden should be 
imposed upon the transaction. Such a result is achieved under the 
pattern of taxation applicable to debt. In this situation, neither the 
receipt nor the repayment of the receipt has any income tax conse-
quences, and the deductions for the payment of interest will offset 
the tax imposed upon the return that derived from investing the 
receipt .. 
Conversely, under the pattern for taxing income, an economic 
receipt is immediately taxed in full. Had Abbie simply received 
compensation in the amount of $10,000, for example, she would 
have been subject to a tax of $3,000 and thus would only be able to 
reinvest the $7,000 in after-tax proceeds of the receipt. Since the 
70 The analysis in this section ignores the impact that the likelihood of repayment may 
have upon the current taxation of the receipt. That issue is addressed in the text accompa-
nying notes 126-44 but does not alter the conclusions reached here. 
78 See Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and 
Discount After 1982, 38 Tax L. Rev. 565, 572-74 (1983). 
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receipt would not be offset by a repayment obligation (including 
any obligation to pay interest), Abbie would retain the entire re-
turn generated by the reinvestment of her after-tax proceeds. That 
return, however, would be subject to income taxation. Under the 
sub-system for taxing income, both the initial receipt and the in-
come generated by the investment of the receipt are subject to tax. 
As a result, after six years Abbie's after-tax income would have 
increased to $10,500. 
The pattern of income taxation that Abbie's case exemplifies has 
sometimes been referred to as the "double taxation" of income 
from capital, a phenomenon that has been characterized as defec-
tive in principle. 77 Whether this is an accurate assessment is not 
presently i:J;Ilportant. Defective or not, the immediate taxation of 
receipts and the income generated therefrom is a fundamental 
characteristic of income taxation and thus constitutes the "ideal" 
burden of an income tax. To the extent that the taxation of the 
initial receipt is deferred, or the income derived from the invest-
ment of the receipt untaxed, this normal burden of the income tax 
is avoided and the transaction is subsidized. 78 
In Case One, however, subjecting Abbie's receipt to this sub-sys-
tem for taxing income, as might occur under the judicial approach 
to debt, would produce an incorrect result. If a tax were imposed 
on the receipt of the $10,000 loan, Abbie· would only be able to 
•• See Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370, 370-74 (1979), for a 
discussion of the issue and a collection of authorities. 
The primary consequence of the "double" taxation of investments is that, over time, the 
effective rate of tax on an investment will be greater than the nominal rate of tax. Assume, 
for example, a world without taxation in which a taxpayer receives $1,000 of compensation 
at the end of year 0 that can be invested at a 10% return. After two years this investment 
would grow to $1,210. It might be supposed that, following the introduction of a 30% tax, a 
taxpayer (assuming no change in interest rates) should be left with 70% of $1,210, or $847. 
Under the existing structure of the income tax, however, that is not the correct result. The 
initial receipt would be subject to tax which would only allow the investment of $700. Since 
the return on that investment would also be subject to current taxation, that amount would 
grow at a 7% after-tax rate of return and thus would produce only $801 after two years. 
Under other systems of taxation, this effective increase in the nominal rate of tax can be 
avoided. In particular, under a consumption tax, the salary and the return from the invest-
ment of the salary would not be subject to tax until it was withdrawn from investment and 
consumed. Thus, after two years the taxpayer would have accumulated $1,210. Subjecting 
that amount to a 30% tax at the end of year 2 would, of course, preserve the nominal rate of 
tax on the overall transaction. 
•• For a careful description of the resulting subsidy, see Johnson, Soft Money Investing 
Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019 (1989). 
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invest, and thus earn a return, on the after-tax proceeds of the 
receipt. At a 30% tax rate, Abbie would only be able to invest 
$7,000 and thus would derive a pre-tax annual return of $700. 
However, she still would be required to pay interest to Distributor 
on the full $10,000. As a result, Abbie would be required to pay out 
$1,000 in interest annually - $300 more than she was able to 
earn.79 The imposition of an immediate tax on the proceeds of the 
loan would convert a transaction that had previously been econom-
ically neutral into one generating an after-tax economic loss.80 
That result, so fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of taxing 
only gains in wealth, would be plainly incorrect. 
This initial overtaxation of Abbie will not be corrected by per-
mitting her to deduct 'the repayment of the $10,000 in year 6; All 
other things remaining equal, the tax benefit from that deduction 
will precisely offset the amount of the tax burden imposed upon 
her in year 1.81 However, that benefit will not adequately compen-
sate Abbie for the premature imposition of tax. The deduction in 
year 6 will not reverse the harm that Abbie suffered as a conse-
quence of losing the opportunity to invest an amount equal to the 
tax paid in year 1 over the six year period that the transaction 
remained open. Thus, even though her transaction was economi-
cally neutral prior to taxation, Abbie will still suffer an after-tax 
loss. 5 2 
The fundamental error in taxing Abbie's receipt thus becomes 
•• Of course, if the borrower reinvests the proceeds at a different rate of return than the 
interest rate charged by the lender, the borrower will obtain an economic gain, or loss. That 
profit or loss, attributable to the management of the funds by the borrower, will produce 
taxable income or loss. Thus, any economic changes experienced by the borrower will be 
reflected in his income tax. 
•• Under some circumstances, the improper tax burden resulting from the imposition of 
this tax could be offset by extending to the lender an immediate deduction in the amount of 
the loan. The resulting tax benefit to the lender might then eliminate the burden on the 
borrower, viewing the parties together. Such "surrogate" taxation is discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 155-57. The possibility of this "two wrongs can make a right" approach 
to taxation does not detract from the text's conclusion that taxing the borrower is improper. 
11 That is, the $3,000 reduction in her tax liability produced by deducting the repayment 
will equal the $3,000 tax imposed upon the receipt. 
•• The detriment to Abbie can be expressed differently. The present value of the tax 
benefit in year 6, discounted over the six years of the transaction, will be significantly less 
than the immediate burden of the tax in year 1. The difference between the present value of 
the tax benefit and the nominal value of the tax burden represents the present value of the 
income that could be earned investing an amount equal to the tax paid. It thus equals the 
present value of the loss sustained by Abbie. 
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apparent from an examination of the income generated by the re-
investment of the receipt. Imposing a tax on the receipt is errone-
ous not merely because the tax would violate an abstract principle 
barring taxation in the absence of, or in advance of, an accretion to 
wealth. Rather, taxation is improper because the imposition of tax 
would deprive the taxpayer of the ability to fund the obligation to 
make payments of interest on the offsetting liability. Since that 
deprivation is inconsistent with the very concept of income taxa-
tion, the imposition of tax is improper. The critically important 
corollary to this observation, developed below, is that taxing Ab-
bie's receipt is not improper merely because the receipt was offset 
by a repayment obligation; the repayment of that obligation was 
fully funded by the deduction available in year 6. 
It remains to be considered, of course, whether these conclusions 
would be altered if Abbie in fact failed to repay the receipt. That 
possibility appears to be a substantial factor in the test applied by 
the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power, with its focus upon the 
borrower's control over repayment. 83 An analysis of the conversion 
of loan proceeds to retained income, and of the tax imposed at that 
time, appears below. Assuming for the moment, however, that the 
transaction is concluded in accordance with its terms, it seems im-
proper to impose tax on a receipt during the period that the re-
ceipt is offset by a repayment obligation bearing a market rate of 
interest. 
Analysis of the simplest case of receipts that are offset by obliga-
tions of equivalent value demonstrates, at least in one context, that 
the definition of debt employed by the Supreme Court is inade-
quate. To secure a correct burden of tax on Abbie's transaction, 
her receipt must not be subject to tax. Under our income tax sys-
tem, that result should be achieved by recognizing the repayment 
obligation and classifying her receipt as the proceeds of a loan. 
Under the judicial definition of debt, however, that classification is 
not assured. In Indianapolis Power, the borrower's control over re-
payment was deemed far more significant than the interest rate, 
and this suggests that the repayment obligation might be ignored 
and the receipt currently taxed. However, as Case One illustrates, 
that result would be incorrect as long as Abbie in fact pays a mar-
ket rate of interest. 
•• See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
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B. Non-Interest Bearing Repayment Obligations 
The impropriety of imposing a current tax upon a receipt offset 
by a repayment obligation bearing a market rate of interest would 
not be controversial were it not for the doubt repeatedly cast upon 
that principle by the Supreme Court.8• Similarly, the taxation of 
receipts that are not offset by any repayment obligation - while 
not alway~ followed in practice - is really not debated in princi-
ple.811 Rather, what has proven to be surprisingly elusive is determ-
ing the proper taxation of receipts that are offset by a non-interest 
bearing repayment obligation. 
CASE TWO 
Like Abbie, Bob is employed by Distributor and obtains a $10,000 
loan from his employer. The note given by Bob in exchange for the 
loan also matures in six years but does not bear any stated interest. 
Bob is also subject to a marginal tax rate of 30% and can earn a 
10% pre-tax return on his investments. 
With the tools available under present law, there are three possi-
ble income tax consequences of such a transaction to Bob. Under 
the judicial approach to debt, the receipt might be (1) entirely ex-
cluded from income, by respecting the parties' characterization of 
the transaction; or (2) entirely included in income, by recharacter-
izing the receipt as disguised compensation. The third possible 
outcome would involve the bifurcation of the receipt as required by 
section 7872. In fact, under current law section 7872 would pre-
empt the judicial approach and the transaction would be bifur-
cated. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the consequences 
of applying the Supreme Court's "ali-or-nothing" approach. 
1. The Judicial Approach 
Under the decision in Indianapolis Power, Bob's receipt might 
very well be excluded from his income because it constituted the 
proceeds of a loan. His receipt is offset by an unconditional obliga-
tion to repay the entire amount borrowed. Under the Court's rea-
soning, the absence of stated interest eppears to be of little rele-
.. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text. 
•• See Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019. 
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vance. However, unli~e Abbie's receipt, Bob's receipt is not offset 
by an obligation of equivalent value. Because his obligation is non-
interest bearing, the value of that obligation to Distributor will be 
considerably less than the nominal principal amount of the obliga-
tion. In fact, the value of the obligation will be equal to the present 
value of the repayment obligation, discounted at Bob's after-tax 
interest rate. That is, the actual present burden of the obligation is 
equal to the funds that Bob would be required to invest today to 
produce $10,000 in six years, after reinvesting the after-tax return 
on that amount.86 That figure, $10,000 discounted over six years at 
7%, presently would be only $6,667. Accordingly, at the time of the 
initial receipt, Bob derived an increase in net worth equal to the 
amount by which the actual receipt of $10,000 exceeded the pre-
sent value of the repayment obligation of $6,667. Bob, therefore, 
realized a gain of $3,333 at the time of the initial receipt. 
Just as it would have been incorrect to tax Abbie in the absence 
of an increase in her wealth, it is necessary to impose an immediate 
tax on Bob's increase in wealth. The failure to do so would result 
in the material undertaxation of his transaction relative to Abbie's. 
In principle, the impropriety of not taxing Bob's increase in wealth 
· at the time it occurs, and the magnitude of that impropriety, is 
well understood. The failure to currently tax an economic receipt 
that produces an accretion to wealth is equivalent to exempting 
from tax the income earned from investing that receipt. 87 That re-
lationship can best be seen by comparing the results of a single 
year under the alternative treatments, as shown by the· table be-
low. Under the first regime, corresponding to the correct applica-
tion of the sub-system for taxing income, the receipt is fully taxed 
but deducted at the end of the period. Under the second, corre-
sponding to the failure to tax Bob's $3,333 increase in wealth, the 
receipt is not taxed until the end of the period. 
•• Because the repayment of the $10,000 principal amount of the loan to Bob would not 
be deductible to any extent, an accumulation of the full $10,000 would be required to repay 
the loan. 
87 See Fellows, supra note 1, at 732-33. 
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Receipt 
Tax 
Net to Invest 
10% Return 
Tax at 30% 
Net Return 
Net Amount 
Tax 
Total 
Preference 
Redefining Debt 
INCOME TAXED 
$3,333 
1,000 
2,333 
233" 
(70) 
163 
2,496 
(0) 
2,496 
609 
TAX DEFERRED 
$3,333 
0 
3,333 
333 
(100) 
233 
3,566 
(1,000) 
2,566 
70 
The highlighted figures reveal that the after-tax investment re-
turn derived from investing the pre-tax proceeds of the receipt 
($233) is equal to the pre-tax investment return derived from in-
vesting the after-tax proceeds ($233). Therefore, it may be ob-
served that the overall economic effect of not taxing an economic 
receipt is equivalent to not taxing the income produced by the re-
ceipt. Accordingly, to the extent that Bob's increase in wealth is 
not taxed, he would obtain a tax preference. This preference would 
be equivalent to exempting from tax the income derived from in-
vesting the $3,333 increase in wealth over the period that the 
transaction remained open. Under an income tax, it simply is 
wrong not to tax either a receipt that produces an economic gain or 
the income from investing that receipt. When the transaction re-
mains open for a long period of time, that improper benefit, or tax 
subsidy, can be quite substantial. 
While a proper burden of taxation could be achieved by subject-
ing Bob to a current tax on his $3,333 gain at the time of the initial 
receipt, an identical result can be obtained in an easier fashion. 
The same burden of taxation would be achieved by taxing the en-
tire amount of the non-interest bearing receipt when received, and 
permitting a deduction for the repayment of that amount when 
paid. Thus, immediate taxation of the entire receipt would burden 
Bob with a $3,000 tax (30% of the $10,000 receipt). However, de-
ducting that same amount in year 6, when the receipt is actually 
repaid, would produce a tax benefit with a present value of $2,000 
. (after being discounted at Bob's after-tax rate of interest). Accord-
'ingly, in present value terms, the net burden of tax imposed upon 
the overall transaction would be $1,000. On the other hand, impos-
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ing an immediate tax on Bob's initial gain of $3,333 would result in 
an identical $1,000 net tax burden. 
Because of this relationship, a proper burden of taxation can be 
imposed upon Bob without incurring the complexity of computing 
the present value of, or ascertaining the actual maturity of, the re-
payment obligation. A proper tax burden will be achieved if a non-
interest bearing receipt is subject to immediate taxation, provided 
that a deduction is allowed for the entire amount of the repay-
ment, if and when made. Subjecting Bob to current taxation on the 
entire $10,000 amount of the receipt initially might have appeared 
to produce an improper result because Bob would be taxed on an 
amount greater than his $3,333 actual increase in net worth. How-
ever, because the combination of a current tax and a deferred de-
duction produces the same result as the current taxation of the 
actual increase in wealth, a correct burden is in fact achieved. 
Subjecting Bob's receipt to immediate taxation in full, notwith-
standing the existence of a non-interest bearing repayment obliga-
tion, is the result that would be achieved under the judicial defini-
tion of debt if Bob's repayment obligation were wholly 
disregarded. Ignoring that obligation would result in the character-
ization of the receipt as disguised compensation and the assign-
ment of the receipt to the sub-system for taxing income. As in the 
analysis of Abbie's case, the propriety of that result can most read-
ily be observed from an examination of the economic consequences 
of investing the receipt. 
What distinguishes Bob's receipt from Abbie's, of course, is that 
he does not have the economic burden of paying interest on the 
receipt. In Abbie~s case, that burden required the deferral of tax on 
the receipt to allow her to fund the obligation to pay interest. In 
Bob's case, that justification for assigning his receipt to the sub-
system for taxing debt is wholly lacking. Accordingly, if Bob's re-
ceipt is to be treated as the proceeds of a loan, that result must be 
justified by the existence of the non-interest bearing repayment 
obligation itself. However, the mere presence of a non-interest 
bearing repayment obligation does not justify the deferral of tax 
upon a receipt. 
If Bob's $10,000 receipt were taxed when it was obtained, he 
would be left with only the $7,000 after-tax proceeds of the receipt. 
Upon the investment of that amount, those proceeds would grow 
at an after-tax rate of return to $10,500 over the six year maturity 
1991] Redefining Debt 611 
of the loan. However, if Bob were then required to return the ini-
tial receipt, he would obtain a tax benefit of $3,000 upon the de-
duction of the $10,000 payment. The after-tax burden of the re-
payment would then be $7,000. Accordingly, Bob would be able to 
return the entire principal amount of the receipt, while retaining 
the full $3,500 after-tax profit from investing the receipt for six 
years. Thus, if a repayment obligation is ultimately honored, the 
taxpayer will be fully compensated for the initial taxation of the 
receipt by the deduction obtained for the full amount of that re-
payment in the year in which it occurs. Accordingly, the mere exis-
tence of Bob's repayment obligation does not justify the deferral of 
the taxation of his receipt. 
The net result of taxing the initial receipt, and granting a deduc-
tion for the repayment, is simply to limit Bob's investment over 
the six years to the after-tax proceeds of his receipt, while permit-
ting the retention of the entire after-tax return on that investment. 
This result, of course, corresponds precisely to the burden of taxa-
tion imposed by the sub-system for taxing income. Indeed, the 
$3,500 after:tax profit that Bob would retain under this pattern of 
taxation represents the after-tax yield on the six-year investment 
of the $10,000 receipt. 
Imposing a current tax on Bob's receipt thus leaves Bob in the 
same economic position as one who derived a $10,000 itein of fully 
taxable income for the six years over which Bob retained his re-
ceipt. That result is entirely sound. Bob obtained an interest-free 
receipt, and thus was entitled to retain the full amount of the af-
ter-tax return from investing the receipt. Since Bob obtained the 
economic benefit of the receipt of income while the transaction re-
mained open, subjecting his transaction to the sub-system for tax-
ing income is entirely appropriate. 
On the other hand,, treating Bob's receipt as the proceeds of a 
loan is unjustifiable and produces an incorrect result. Under the 
sub-system for taxing debt, Bob would be able to inve.st the entire 
$10,000 pre-tax receipt. Because he is not obligated to pay interest 
on that receipt, he would retain the entire after-tax return on that 
investment. Thus, at the end of six years, Bob's investment would 
have grown to $15,000. Upon the discharge of his repayment obli-
gation, which would not have income tax consequences, Bob would 
retain an after-tax profit of $5,000 on his transaction. This is 
$1,500 more profit than the $3,500 profit that Bob would derive 
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under the sub-system for taxing income. This additional profit rep-
resents Bob's return on a six-year investment of an amount equal 
to the $3,000 tax payable on his receipt, under the sub-system for 
taxing income. Thus, it reflects the value of the deferral of that 
tax. 
Under this pattern of taxation, Bob would avoid one of the levels 
of tax imposed by the sub-system for taxing income, even though 
he obtains the economic benefits of the receipt of income. As a 
result, Bob would have obtained the benefits of deferring taxation 
of his receipt (as extended by the sub-system for taxing debt), even 
though he was not subject to the economic burdens that would jus-
tify such a deferral. Accordingly, Bob would have achieved an af-
ter-tax result more favorable than that extended by a proper appli-
cation of either the sub-system for taxing income or the sub-
system for taxing debt. That benefit would constitute a significant 
and unwarranted tax preference. 
The broader principle that emerges from this comparison of 
Bob's transaction with Abbie's is that the justification for the 
deferral of tax provided by the sub-system for taxing debt lies not 
in the repayment obligation itself, but rather in the obligation to 
pay a market rate of interest on that obligation. Absent the eco-
nomic burden created by that interest expense, the justification for 
the deferral of tax disappears. Instead of resulting in a correct allo-
cation of tax liabilities, applying the sub-system for taxing debt to 
a receipt that is offset by a non-interest bearing obligation results 
in the material undertaxation of the recipient. Therefore, the judi-
cial approach to debt errs to the extent that it would recognize the 
full principal amount of a non-interest bearing repayment obliga-
tion as offsetting the tax otherwise applicable to a receipt. 
Whether any portion of such a receipt should be recognized as 
"debt" depends upon the propriety of the congressional approach 
to debt. 
2. The Section 7872 Approach 
The other approach to the taxation of Bob's receipt under cur-
rent law would be the bifurcation approach of section 7872. Under 
section 7872, the transaction is wholly reconstructed and treated as 
if Bob received a discounted loan bearing interest at the market 
rate of 10%, as well as an amount of taxable compensation. The 
non-taxable principal amount of the discounted loan is quite prop-
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erly computed by discounting the nominal amount of the repay-
ment obligation of $10,000 by a pre-tax interest rate to determine 
the amount of interest that would in fact be paid at the maturity 
of such a loan. Under that approach, Bob would be treated as re-
ceiving a discounted loan in the amount of $5,640 that ultimately 
would require the payment of $4,360 in interest. In addition, Bob 
would be treated as receiving immediately taxable income of 
$4,360. The taxation of the discounted loan would be controlled by 
the usua:l rules of the Code governing discounted interest. Thus, 
Bob would be entitled to accrue an annual interest deduction,88 
computed under compound interest principles, that would equal 
the income that could be earned by investing the loan's $5,640 pro-
ceeds at the same rate of interest. Because of that deduction, the 
$5,640 will increase at Bob's pre-tax rate of return and in six years 
will equal the $10,000 required to repay the receipt. 
If Bob had in fact received compensation of $4,360 and a dis-
counted loan of $5,640, the overall burden of taxation imposed by 
·section 7872 would clearly be correct. However, that is not what 
Bob received, and the section 7872 result is incorrect.89 The anal-
ogy to the receipt of a discounted loan plus an unrelated payment 
is false, and results in the material undertaxation of the recipients 
of interest-free receipts. 
Under section 7872, taxpayers are treated as the recipients of 
discounted loans because that reconstruction is thought to be the 
most accurate reflection of the borrower's theoretical income. 
Working backwards from the amount the borrower is obligated to 
. repay, the pre-tax present value of the repayment obligation 
clearly represents the principal amount of the loan that could have 
been obtained for that repayment, on the maturity date, and at the 
assumed rate of interest. Accordingly, it is concluded, that com-
puted amount represents the market value of the repayment obli-
gation and is thus the portion of the receipt that does not re-
•• I.R.C. § 163(e) (1988). 
•• It is not surprising that there are different ways of recharacterizing, and thus taxing, an 
interest-free receipt. A non-interest bearing "loan" does not reflect commercial reality and 
thus must be reconstructed to bring the transaction into conformity with its economic sub-
stance. Not uncommonly under the tax laws, in such a situation there will be two or more 
competing potential characterizations, each having different income tax consequences. See 
Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1019 (1988). 
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present a gain. As such, it should not be subject to tax. 
The fallacy in this justification for the section 7872 approach is 
that the recipient of an interest-free loan is not in the same legal 
or economic position as the borrower on a discounted loan, and 
thus the reconstruction does not reflect the market value of the 
repayment obligation. Had Bob in fact received a discounted loan 
of $5,640, the lending Distributor would be entitled to be repaid 
that amount, free of tax, plus interest of $4,360, which would be 
fully taxable. Because that interest would be taxed as it accrued, 
Distributor's investment in Bob would grow at an after-tax rate of 
interest, as would any other normally taxed investment. Thus, 
upon repayment in full, Distributor would be left with $8,460 after 
the payment of all taxes, not $10,000. For that reason, a true dis-
counted loan may be terminated at any time, without prejudice to 
either party, for a payment of the original amount loaned plus in-
terest accrued to that date. Assuming that Distributor could rein-
vest that amount at the same return, the investment would con-
tinue to grow at an after-tax rate of interest and would produce 
$8,460 by the end of year 6. 
The maker of an interest-free loan, however, is entitled to re-
ceive $10,000 at the end of year 6 free of all taxes. Accordingly, to 
terminate the transaction without prejudice would require that 
Bob pay Distributor an amount that would grow, after taxes had 
been paid currently on the return from that amount, to $10,000-
not merely $8,460. That is, Bob would be required to pay an 
amount equal to $10,000, discounted to the date of termination at 
an after-tax rate of interest. As seen above,90 on the date of the 
receipt that amount would be $6,667, not $5,640. 
In fact, therefore, Bob is not in the same position as if he had 
received a discounted loan. The legal and economic relationships 
established by an interest-free loan are quite different from the 
relationships established by the receipt of an interest-bearing, dis-
counted loan. It follows that the approach of section 7872 cannot 
be justified by analogy to a discounted loan. 
Indeed, the result reached under section 7872 cannot be justified 
at all; as shown above, the correct amount for which Bob should be 
taxed in year 1 is $3,333, not $4,360. Moreover, after excluding the 
$6,667 from income in year 1, Bob should not be entitled to any 
•• See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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further tax benefit from the repayment of the receipt, because the 
exclusion would fully compensate Bob for the burden of the repay-
ment obligation. Thus, Bob may set that $6,667 aside91 and in year 
6, after accumulating the after-tax return on that amount, he 
would have the $10,000 required to repay the receipt. Section 7872 
is therefore in error in two related respects: the recipient is over-
taxed upon the commencement of the transaction, while in future 
years the recipient is undertaxed by the amount of the deductions 
allowed for the artificially created interest. As shall be seen, the 
net effect of section 7872 is to materially undertax the recipients of 
interest-free receipts. 
The attempt to justify section 7872 by analogy to a discounted 
loan is simply circular. Computing the present value of the repay-
ment obligation using a pre-tax rate of interest would be correct 
only if the obligor were entitled to interest deductions that would 
offset the income produced by investing the receipt, thereby al-
lowing the investment to grow free of tax (that is, at the pre-tax 
rate). However, the obligor would only be entitled to those deduc-
tions if the transaction were reconstructed as an interest-bearing 
loan. Thus, the analogy to a discounted loan is simply a restate-
ment of the erroneous result produced by section 7872 . 
. More importantly, perhaps, the burden of taxation imposed on 
Bob by section 7872 is inconsistent with the principles of the sub-
system for· taxing debt and the sub-system for taxing income. It 
was observed above that the failure to impose any current tax on 
Bob's receipt was incorrect, because it allowed Bob to earn and 
retain a return on his temporary investment that was greater than 
the $3,500 that would result from the proper application of the 
sub-system for taxing income. Section 7872, however, produces 
precisely the same preferential tax burden with respect to the por-
tion of the receipt that remains untaxed. Thus, under that provi-
sion, Bob is entitled to retain an amount equal to the amount for 
which he was initially subject to tax, plus the return thereon. After 
six years, this would amount to $4,578 - a result that is too 
favorable to the taxpayer.92 
•• Alternatively, Bob could transfer the same amount to the lender in year 1 and by year 
6 the lender would have the same $10,000. 
••. The reinvestment of the amount treated as a loan, increasing at a pre-tax rate of re-
turn, will be sufficient to repay the $10,000 after six years. The after-tax proceeds of the 
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Under the reconstruction of the receipt required by section 7872, 
the transaction is divided into two portions, only one of which is 
taxed. Upon the conclusion of the transaction, ·the borrower will · 
have repaid an amount exactly equal to the amount of the initial 
receipt. Of that repayment, the borrower will be entitled to a de-
duction equal to the portion of the receipt originally taxed. How-
ever, the borrower will not be entitled to deduct an amount equal 
to the portion that was received without tax. Thus, ignoring the· 
complex recharacterization mandated by section 7872, the tax-
payer is treated as receiving two separate receipts, each of which is 
offset by a non-interest bearing repayment obligation. One of these 
receipts is subject to immediate taxation and thus is properly 
taxed under the rules of the sub-system for taxing income.93 How-
ever, the other receipt -while economically identical to the first 
- is not properly taxed, but instead is granted the deferral bene-
fits of the sub-system for taxing debt. Because this receipt is not 
interest-bearing, however, it should not be entitled to . that 
treatment. 
As may be observed, the net effect of section 7872 is to extend to 
one portion of the receipt exactly the same pattern of taxation as 
would be extended to the entire receipt under a tax-free .applica-
tion of the judicial approach. Section 7872 improves upon the judi-
cial approach by imposing a partial tax, but fails to achieve a cor-
rect level of taxation for the overall transaction. The burden of 
taxation imposed remains more favorable than the result that 
would be achieved under either the sub-system for taxing debt or 
the sub-system for taxing income. 
The economic reality of Case Two is that Bob borrowed $10,000, 
repaid the loan, and was able to retain all of the income generated 
by his investment of the $10,000. Any reconstruction of that trans-
action that seeks to treat a portion of the receipt as offset by an 
interest-bearing obligation cannot achieve a correct result, because 
the repayment obligation is in reality not interest-bearing. Rather, 
because Bob could retain the entire amount of income generated 
amount treated as income, 70% of $4,360 or $3,052, would grow to $4,578, all of which Bob 
would retain. 
•• In fact, even 'the taxable portion of the receipt is treated too favorably. Because the 
repayment of that portion of the receipt is treated as a payment of interest, Bob would be 
entitled to accrue annual deductions aggregating that amount. In fact, Bob should not be 
entitled to that deduction until repayment actually occurs. 
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by his investment- thus obtaining the economic benefits of earn-
ing income during the six years the transaction remained open - a 
correct tax result can only be achieved by subjecting the entire 
amount of the receipt to current taxation. 
Section 7872 is the result of a too casual extension of the princi-
ples of section 483 and the notion that any deferred payment nec-
essarily contains an interest factor. 94 Under that view, since Bob's 
receipt must contain interest, the receipt must be recast to reveal· 
that interest factor and thus the "real" amount that was loaned. 
The problem is that Bob's receipt did not contain interest and the 
real amount on loan was the entire amount of the receipt. This 
does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the receipt must 
be recast to include interest. Rather, it should lead to the conclu-
sion that the transaction should not be treated as a loan for income 
tax purposes at all. Because Bob was not required to fund any obli-
gation to pay interest, his entire receipt should be taxed under the 
sub-system for taxing income. Bifurcation under section 483 is a 
useful analytical tool for identifying the character of a gain real-
ized by a taxpayer; the use of that tool to create interest, however, 
produces an incorrect income tax result because it converts an ele-
ment of income into a tax-exempt receipt. 
The foregoing analysis of Case Two demonstrates that the recip-
ients of interest-free receipts are not correctly taxed under the 
congressional approach to debt embodied in section 7872. The cre-
ation-of-interest concept underlying that provision is simply erro-
neous. Interestingly, however, interest-free receipts might be cor-
rectly taxed under the aU-or-nothing judicial approach. Wholly 
disregarding the repayment obligation and subjecting the entire 
amount of the receipt to current taxation would produce the cor-
rect result. This would occur if time value of money principles 
were used to determine whether an obligation should be respected 
or ignored, rather than used to bifurcate a single transaction.911 
.. See Lokken, supra note 1, at 11 (describing this notion as the "first premise" of the 
time value of money). 
•• While the undertaxation of receipts should not be tolerated when a likelihood exists 
that the payment will not be deductible, it is not at all clear that the overtaxation of a 
receipt would be equally offensive to sound income tax policy. Advocates of the bifurcation 
approach would regard the full inclusion of an interest-free receipt in income as overtaxa-
tion of borrowers, notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary made herein. However, 
that result lies within the control of the parties. 
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Our analysis of section 7872 suggests several further conclusions 
regarding the kind of repayment obligations that should be recog-
nized for income tax purposes. Plainly, receipts should only be 
treated as the proceeds of a loan to the extent they are offset by 
repayment obligations that bear a market rate of interest. More-
over, for the purpose of computing that rate of interest, only actual 
interest stated by the parties should be taken into account. Ficti-
tious interest does not support the recognition of repayment obli-
gations. Accordingly, for income tax purposes, the definition of 
debt should be limited to receipts that are offset by repayment ob-
ligations that bear stated interest at a market rate. 
IV. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS 
While the primary significance of the sub-system for taxing debt 
lies in the treatment of conventional loans, the rules of that sub-
system are applicable to a far broader range of transactions. 
Throughout the history of the income tax, taxpayers have sought 
to exclude from income receipts that were either subject to various 
fixed or contingent obligations to repay, or that forced the tax-
payer to incur analogous costs in the future. In some cases, they 
have prevailed. Indianapolis Power, for example, involved cash de-
posits to secure the customer's obligation to make future payments 
for services. 96 The decision not to impose a tax on the receipt when 
received essentially involved a decision to subject the deposit to 
the pattern of taxation applicable to debt. Similarly, in American 
Automobile Ass'n v. United States97 the taxpayer sought to escape 
the current taxation of payments for services to be rendered in fu-
The parties to the kinds of transfers considered in this article will always be able to secure 
a proper pattern for taxing their transaction by charging a commercially reasonable rate of 
interest. If the parties choose to proceed in a different manner, the fact that their transac-
tion may be overtaxed does not seem to be of particular importance. In effect, the parties 
have chosen to accept a heavier pattern of taxation as the price for engaging in a transaction 
that does not conform to a standard of commercial reasonableness. That burden of taxation, 
therefore, cannot be viewed as unfair in any important sense. Accordingly, in the present 
context, if a choice must be made between the undertaxation or the overtaxation of receipts, 
the overtaxation of the recipient would represent far sounder income tax policy. 
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also City Gas Co. of Florida v. Commis-
sioner, 689 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982). Compare Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 
128 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir. 1942) (rent deposit was not taxable income) with Gilken Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1949) (rent deposit was taxable income) . 
.. 367 u.s. 687 (1961). 
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ture years. Had the taxpayer prevailed, the receipt would have 
been taxed under the sub-system for taxing debt.98 Since the pat-
tern for taxing traditional loans has neve·r been questioned,99 most 
judicial decisions defining the type of transactions subject to the 
sub-system for taxing debt have involved such quasi-loan 
transactions. 
Moreover, while the sub-system for taxing debt normally is 
viewed in its role of excluding a receipt from income, it also con-
trols the timing of deductions. Since the effect of a deduction is 
merely to shelter an equivalent amount of income from tax, the 
effect of applying the sub-system to an expenditure is identical to 
its application to a receipt. For example, in Mooney Aircraft, Inc. 
v. United States100 the taxpayer, a seller of aircraft, issued a 
"Mooney Bond" in the principal amount of $1,000 to each pur-
chaser of an aircraft.101 The bond would be redeemed by the tax-
payer upon the permanent retirement of the aircraft from ser-
vice.102 The taxpayer sought to deduct from income the face 
amount of the Mooney Bonds in the year of sale.103 Had that posi-
tion been sustaine.d, the taxpayer would have avoided tax on 
$1,000 of otherwise taxable income, and the receipt would have 
been taxed under the sub-system for taxing debt. 
Paralleling the judicial approach to the definition of debt in the 
context of conventional loans, the courts have not analyzed these 
tax deferral claims by reference to economic consequences. Never-
theless, when deferral is extended, the effect is to extend to these 
transactions the pattern of taxation used in the sub-system for tax-
ing debt, not income. Because the deferral of tax on a receipt -
whether achieved by an exclusion or a deduction - has the effect 
•• Of course, that result would not be reached by characterizing the receipt as debt. For 
example, the legal issue presented in American Automobile was whether the Commissioner's 
authority to require the use of an accounting method that clearly reflected income could 
prevail over the requirements of the accrual method of accounting. See American Automo-
bile, 367 U.S. at 690-92. In any such situation, the receipt will be subject either to the sub-
system for taxing debt or the sub-system for taXing income. 
" Even fully non-recourse debt is in general subject to the sub-system for taxing debt, 
although that treatment is sometimes controversial and has to some extent been altered by 
statute. See I.R.C. § 465 (tax deductions limited to amount at risk). 
100 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). 
101 Id. at 402. 
101 ld. 
1os Id. 
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of treating the receipt as if it were the proceeds of a loan, the prin-
ciples developed above for determining when such treatment is ap-
propriate are equally applicable to the classification of all such 
receipts. 
A. Advance Payments 
In Case Two, Bob's receipt could have been a payment by the 
Distributor to Bob for goods to be delivered in year 6. Notwith-
standing that modification of the facts of Case Two, however, 
Bob's economic position would remain unchanged. He would be in 
possession of a $10,000 receipt that must be returned in year 6, 
albeit through the delivery of goods in kind rather than the repay-
ment of cash. Bob might then seek to defer the taxation of that 
receipt to the year in which the amount of the receipt was earned 
by the delivery of the goods.104 Alternatively, Bob might seek to 
offset the income generated by the receipt in year 1 by the amount 
of the costs that he would incur in fulfilling his obligati·on to de-
liver goods in year 6.106 In either event, should Bob prevail, the 
timing of the taxation of the receipt would be governed by the 
rules of the sub-system for taxing debt. That is, no tax would be 
imposed upon the receipt when received; rather, a tax would only 
be imposed later, when the receipt was no longer returnable and 
thus was converted to taxable income. 
Because this transaction's economic effect would be identical to 
the economic effect of the receipt of loan proceeds, whether the 
deferral of tax on such an advance payment will produce a correct 
· income tax burden on the receipt must be determined by the same 
principles that control the taxation of conventional loans. Thus, if 
the recipient is not required to pay interest on the advance pay-
ment, the failure to impose a full tax at the time the receipt is first 
obtained would result in the undertaxation of the recipient. Over 
the six years in which the transaction remained open, the recipient 
would be able to invest the pre-tax amount of the receipt, notwith-
standing the fact that he was not required to pay any interest on 
the receipt. As demonstrated above, this is simply an incorrect re-
104 This approach has been tried by taxpayers in a number of cases. See, e.g., Hagen Ad-
vertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969); Artnell Co. v. Com-
missioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968). 
••• See, e.g., Bell Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 158 (1965). 
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suit. The reason for obtaining an interest-free receipt is completely 
irrelevant to the economic effect of possessing the receipt, and thus 
has no bearing on the proper timing for taxation of the receipt.106 
As in the original version of Case Two, because of the absence of 
interest, the amount of the receipt exceeds the present value of the 
obligation to deliver goods. This results in an immediate increase 
in Bob's net worth that should be subject to tax. However, as de-
rived above,. an equivalent and far more conveniently computed 
burden of tax can be achieved by subjecting the entire amount of 
the receipt to current taxation and allowing a deduction for the 
ultimate repayment. 107 Thus, the full amount of a non-interest 
bearing advance payment must be subject to tax upon receipt. 108 
On the other hand, if interest is payable on the ·advance pay-
ment, the immediate taxation of the receipt would result in the 
overtaxation of the recipient. The investment of the after-tax pro-
ceeds of the receipt would not yield a sufficient return to permit 
the payment of a market rate of interest on the entire amount of 
108 In practice, the taxation of advance payments has become ensnared in a variety of 
accounting doctrines, including the requirements of accrual accounting and the desire to 
reflect income and associated expenditures in the same period. See generally Malman, 
Treatment of Prepaid Income- Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 Tax L. 
Rev. 103 (1981). It is, of course, legitimate to inquire as to what rule Congress has pre-
scribed and whether this rule conforms to a theoretically correct outcome. The issue here, 
however, is not what rule Congress has provided, but rather what rule would be correct in 
principle. Concerns over accrual accounting and the matching of income and expense are 
not relevant to this issue. 
As in Case Two, taxing a receipt, while not allowing a deduction for the future costs of 
earning the receipt, may appear to impose a tax on an amount greater than the actual in-
crease in net worth (and thus mis-match income and expense). However, since taxing the 
receipt when obtained, and allowing a deduction for costs as they are discharged, is 
equivalent to taxing the excess of the receipt over the present value of the future obligation, 
a correct burden of taxation in fact would be achieved: 
. 
107 Normally, an advance payment will not actually be repaid. This can be viewed two 
ways. First, upon the delivery of the goods, the loan transaction could be viewed as closed 
by the constructive repayment of the full amount of the loan, the proceeds of which would 
be returned to the seller in payment for the goods. That repayment of the loan would gener-
ate a deduction that would be offset by. the receipt of the taxable proceeds of the sale. 
Second, and more simply, the retention of the advance payment might be viewed as the 
failure to repay the loan, in which event no tax deduction would be generated. Either view 
produces the correct tax result. 
108 Relatively few decisions have permitted the deferral of tax on advance payments. See 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367· (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 
(1976); Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968). It follows from the dem-
onstration in the text that these decisions were incorrectly decided from the perspective of 
sound income tax policy. 
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the advance payment. Thus, as in Case One, the immediate taxa-
tion of an interest-bearing advance payment would improperly 
convert an economically neutral transaction into one that pro-
duced an after-tax economic loss. Since that result is erroneous, 
the imposition of tax must be deferred until interest is no longer 
payable on the receipt. 109 
While in principle the analysis of how to tax advance payments 
is identical to the analysis of conventional loans, in practice the 
taxation of advance payments raises nearly insoluble factual and 
administrative issues. When a cash receipt must be repaid in cash, 
any interest contained in the transaction will be evident. However, 
when an advance payment in cash is received in exchange for the 
future delivery of goods or services, it may be impossible to actu-
ally determine whether interest is payable on the advance. If so, it 
becomes impossible to determine the correct pattern of taxing the 
advance. In Case Two, for example, the $10,000 advance payment 
would not be interest-bearing if Bob were to charge the same 
$10,000 for the goods, regardless of whether payment was received 
in year 1 or year 6. Conversely, the payment would be interest-
bearing if Bob were obligated to deliver, in year 6, goods that had a 
value of $15,000. However, without independent evidence of the 
value of the goods to be delivered, the existence of an interest fac-
tor in the transaction would be too difficult to establish in the rou-
tine administration of the taxing system. 
Under section 483, the difficulties created by the lack of infor-
mation regarding the taxation of deferred property payments are 
resolved by deeming all such payments to contain an interest com-
ponent.110 By first computing and taxing the interest element in 
the transaction, section 483 renders the independent value of the 
property sold irrelevant. While a similar approach could be taken 
to advance payments, that approach would not produce an accept-
able result. The foregoing analysis of conventional loans demon-
strated that treating a portion of an otherwise non-interest bearing· 
receipt as interest effectively exempts from tax the balance of the 
receipt- and thus undertaxes the recipient. Just as the extension 
of section 483 principles in section 7872 produced an incorrect re-
••• See Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a 'Reverse Investment', 26 Tax Notes 925, 929 
(1985). 
110 See I.R.C. § 483(c). 
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sult, the application of those principles to advance payments pro-
duces a similarly incorrect result. 111 
If the sound administration of the taxing system precludes the 
creation of interest in advance payments when the presence of ac-
tual interest is lacking or uncertain, the most appropriate method 
for taxing such receipts follows a clear path. Unless the taxpayer is 
able to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that retaining the 
advance is contingent upon the delivery of goods ·having a value 
that exceeds the advance by an amount at least equal to a market 
rate of interest, the advance must be treated as non-interest bear-
ing and thus s_ubject to immediate taxation in full. 112 The effect of 
111 By contrast, the application of § 483 to deferred payments will protect revenues from 
the manipulations of taxpayers entering into transactions that do not conform to commer-
cial standards, principally by ensuring that interest is taxable to the seller at ordinary in-
come rates. 
In addition, for the transactions governed by § 483, the factual assumption that the 
purchase price includes an interest factor is far more reasonable than would be the case with 
advance payments. Nevertheless, in principle, sales of property for deferred payments 
should be governed by the principles developed here, instead of being bifurcated. Thus, if 
the value of the property is in fact equal to the amount of a non-interest bearing deferred 
payment, interest should not be created. Instead, the tax benefits to the purchaser of the 
property (e.g. depreciation), and the gain taxable to the seller, should be entirely deferred 
until an actual payment is made. 
111 When a taxpayer is able to demonstrate that an advance payment bears a market rate 
of interest, a theoretically correct burden of taxation may be impossible to achieve. Analyti-
cally, such a transaction represents a loan from the buyer to the seller, maturing on the date 
of delivery of the goods, and containing a discounted interest factor. Upon the delivery of 
the goods, that loan is constructively repaid together with the discount interest. That full 
amount is then returned by the buyer to the seller in payment for the goods delivered. Had 
the transaction involved an actual loan, the receipt of the proceeds would not have been 
subject to tax. While the loan was outstanding, the seller-borrower would have been entitled 
tO accrue annual deductions for the discounted interest, which would have offset the tax 
payable on the return generated by the investment of the advance. The repayment of the 
loan would not have any income tax consequences, yet the receipt of the purchase price for 
the goods would have been fully taxed. 
To apply these concepts to an interest-bearing advance payment would thus require not 
taxing the initial receipt, extending annual deductions to the seller during the years prior to 
delivery, and subjecting the seller to tax in the year of delivery on an amount equal to the 
sum of the initial receipt plus the annual deductions claimed. Moreover, the buyer would 
obtain no deduction at the time of the initial payment, would be taxed annually on the 
discounted interest income, and would obtain a deduction in the year of delivery for an 
amount equal to the sum of the initial payment plus the income previously taxed to him. 
While such a pattern of taxation is .theoretically correct, it would be intolerably complex 
and utterly mystifying for both parties. It is clear that a simpler, if less accurate, solution is 
required. If the constructive loan were ignored and the income tax consequences of an inter-
est-bearing advance payment simply deferred until the transaction was closed and interest 
no longer accrued on the advance, the net effect upon the parties would be to defer the 
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such a rule would be to resolve the administrative problems cre-
ated by lack of information against taxpaye:r;s who enter into am-
biguous transactions. This presumption seems particularly appro-
priate to the extent that the parties are able to secure loan 
treatment for advance payments by expressly providing for stated 
interest at a market rate. 113 
B. Obligations Not Attributable to Receipts 
A liability need not arise from an initial receipt. Taxpayers ~ou­
tinely incur current obligations to perform services or deliver goods 
in the future. Since the costs incurred in the performance of those 
obligations generally are deductible, the income tax analysis of the 
proper treatment of such future costs has focused upon the timing 
of deductions rather than upon the proper definition of debt. Nev-
ertheless, the analysis of the proper timing of the deductions at-
tributable to future costs is identical to the analysis of how to 
properly time the taxation of receipts.114 A logically developed sys-
tem of taxation should treat both forms of obligation alike. The 
facts of Case Two can be modified to illustrate this identity. 
annual income and deductions attributable to the discounted interest until the conclusion of 
the transaction. While imperfect, no other solution is apparent. 
118 The parties could, of course, seek to achieve a deferral of the tax on an advance pay-
ment by merely pretending to pay a market rate of ~nterest. For example, A might make a 
payment of $100 at the end of year 0 for services to be rendered at the end of year 2. If the 
parties treated the value of the services as $121, although they were actually worth only 
$100, the advance would be treated as interest-bearing- even though it actually was not-
and thus would be improperly excluded from income. The utility of that evasion, however, 
would be limited. 
The deferral of tax to the seller would be matched by the offsetting deferral of tax benefit 
to the purchaser. If the purchase price were deductible, the deception would not result in a 
reduction of the overall tax imposed on the transaction. The pretense would thus be useful 
only if the tax burden to the purchaser were less than the tax benefit to the seller, so that 
deferral would produce more benefit than harm. However, casting the advance as a loan 
would result in the creation of taxable interest income of $21 to the purchaser - income 
that would not be created by a non-interest bearing advance payment. If the purchase price 
were not deductible, that income would not be offset, at least immediately, and thus would 
result in increased taxation of the transaction that would offset the net tax reduction from 
deferral. 
114 Some commentators have recognized this identity. See, e.g., Halperin, The Time Value 
of Money, 23 Tax Notes 751 (1984). 
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CASE TWO (DEDUCTION) 
Distributor allows Bob to use its real property as a site for a 
World's Fair, but on the condition that at the conclusion of the 
Fair, Bob will restore the sit~ to its original condition. Restoration 
will occur in six years and can be predicted to cost $10,000. Bob 
remains subject to a 30% rate of tax and can earn a pre-tax return 
of 10% on his investments. 
Bob's economic position in this modification of Case Two is 
identical to his position in the original version; his assets are offset 
by a non-interest bearing obligation to pay, either to Distributor or 
to someone else, $10,000 in six years. Under prior law, if Bob were 
an accrual method taxpayer, he might well have been entitled to a 
deduction for the full $10,000 in year 1, since his obligation to re-
store the property was fixed and the cost was reasonably determi-
nable.116 If that deduction were allowed, Bob could thereby shelter 
$10,000 of his income from current taxation. He thus would be in 
the same after-tax position as if he were allowed to offset the en-
tire amount of a non-interest bearing obligation against a receipt. 
It is therefore not surprising that the courts would allow Bob to 
accrue this deduction well in advance of an actual payment. The 
deduction would be entirely consistent with the ali-or-nothing ju-
dicial approach to debt, to the extent it completely ignores the 
time value of money. 
Whether allowing Bob to accrue this deduction would result in 
the undertaxation of his transaction depends upon the treatment 
of the other party to the transaction, a matter examined below. 
However, just as it was clearly improper not to impose any tax on 
Bob's. receipt of an interest-free loan in the original Case Two, al-
lowing Bob to deduct the entire $10,000 in year 1 of the modified 
Case Two would also be improper. As was the case with the taxa-
tion of interest-free receipts, however, establishing the correct 
treatment of such non-interest bearing future costs has proven 
difficult. 
During the same period in which Congress was developing the 
bifurcation approach of section 7872 as a means of addressing the 
110 See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d 
Cir. 1959). See also Aidinoff & Lopata, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: the 
Treatment of Liabilities Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 Tax 
Lawyer 789 (1980). 
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tax reduction potential of interest-free receipts, consideration was 
given to creating a mechanism for eliminating the similar problems 
posed by the undertaxation of future costs. However, the commen-
tators remain sharply divided over how to devise a pattern for al-
lowing deductions. 116 The Treasury Department argued that the 
correct pattern would be to allow a deduction in year 1 for an 
amount equal to the present value of the obligation, discounted 
over the deferral period at an after-tax rate of interest, and that no 
further tax benefit should be allowed.117 Under this approach, in 
year 1 Bob would be entitled to a deduction of $6,667, which would 
result in an immediate tax benefit of $2,000. However, since that 
tax benefit would be equivalent, in present value terms, to not al-
lowing any deduction in year 1 while allowing a deduction for the 
full $10,000 in year 6, the Treasury advocated the simpler ap-
proach of completely deferring the deduction until the year of per-
formance.116 Under this approach, which is now contained in sec-
tion 461(h) of the Code,119 Bob would be entitled to a deduction in 
year 6 of $10,000, producing a tax benefit of $3,000, the present 
value of which in year 1 would be $2,000. 
Other students of taxation, however, contended that the correct 
treatment would be to allow a deduction for the present value of 
the obligation when it was incurred, computed at a pre-tax rate of 
return, and to allow subsequent deductions for the increase in that 
present value over time. 120 Those annual increases would equal the 
return on the present value of the obligation and, over the period 
in which the transaction remained open, would aggregate the dif-
ference between the present value of the obligation and its face 
amount. Accordingly, by the time the obligation was discharged, 
118 For a discussion of the opposing views, see Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the 
Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 40 Tax L. Rev. 577 (1985). 
117 H.R. Rep. No. 432 (Pt. 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1254-55 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Re-
port]: See also Cunningham, supra note 116, at 583 n.30. 
118 See 1984 Report, supra note 116, at 1255. 
111 Section 461(h) does not, however, require the use of the cash method of accounting in 
deducting future costs. Instead, the deduction is deferred until the obligation is economi-
cally performed, which may involve less than an out-of-pocket expense. See I.R.C. § 
46l(h)(2)(A). 
11° For a discussion of this position, see Cunningham, supra note 116, at 590-99. See also 
Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 Tax Notes 623 (Aug. 10, 
1987); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles Revised, 
38 Tax Notes 831 (Feb. 22, 1988). 
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the taxpayer would have deducted the entire face amount of the 
obligation. Under this approach, Bob would be entitled to a deduc-
tion in year 1 of $5,640 and deductions aggregating $4,360 over the 
succeeding six years. 
As may be observed, these two approaches to the treatment of 
future costs are the mirror images of the two approaches to the 
taxation of interest-free receipts analyzed above. The position pri-
marily adopted by Congress in section 461(h) corresponds to the 
outcome obtained under the ali-or-nothing judicial approach to 
debt: full inclusion of the proceeds of the receipt in income. Curi-
ously, then, the position generally rejected by Congress, 121 but 
urged by some commentators, corresponds to the bifurcation ap-
proach of section 7872. 
For precisely the same reasons that led to the conclusion that 
the proceeds of an interest-free receipt should be fully included in 
income and not subject to bifurcation, the full deferral approach of 
section 461(h) produces the correct pattern for deducting future 
costs. Since Bob will be entitled to retain the entire amount of the 
after-tax return from investing income not dedicated to the pay-
. ment of his six-year obligation, during that period this income 
should be subject to the rules of the sub-system for taxing income, 
rather than the sub-system for taxing debt. Thus, Bob's deduction 
should be entirely deferred until year 6. 
On the other hand, the bifurcation approach would produce a 
manifestly incorrect result. Under that approach, Bob would be 
entitled to deduct the entire amount of the future cost over a pe-
riod of years, 122 and would be entitled to that series of deductions 
in advance of any actual economic detriment. Under an income 
tax, however, permitting a tax benefit in advance of an 
equivalent123 economic loss is always improper. Since the general 
121 This rejection was less than complete. For a limited category of deductions, Congress 
did adopt a bifurcation approach. See I.R.C. § 467; infra note 168. 
111 Where the future cost is in the nature of a capital expense or negative salvage value, 
the bifurcation approach would mean that the pre-tax present value of the cost would be 
depreciated rather than deducted. See Cunningham, supra note 116, at 591. 
118 As demonstrated above, permitting an accelerated deduction for the present value of 
the future cost would not be improper. However, under the bifurcation approach, the tax-
payer would be entitled to deduct not only the present value of the future cost, but also the 
annual increase in that present value. Accordingly, that stream of deductions would un-
avoidably exceed the present value of the future cost and thus would be improper. Indeed, 
those annual deductions effectively shield the income from the investment of the untaxed 
628 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 10:587 
effect of a deduction is identical to the effect of an exclusion from 
income, the acceleration of those deductions is equivalent to ex-
cluding an economic receipt from income. As noted above, 124 that 
result is equivalent to excluding from tax the untaxed receipt's re-
turn, and thus is improper. 
Stated differently, allowing Bob a deduction for funds not yet 
transferred would permit Bob to make an investment of untaxed 
receipts. However, allowing the investment of a pre-tax receipt is 
improper unless the receipt is offset by a repayment obligation 
that bears a market rate of interest. When the receipt is offset in 
this mannner, the recipient must be permitted to fund the obliga-
tion to pay interest through the investment of the pre-tax receipt. 
When the obligation is for a future cost, however, no such obliga-
tion to pay interest exists. Bob will be entitled to retain the entire 
return from the investment of his receipts prior to the discharge of 
the future cost. Accordingly, Bob should be subject to the sub-sys-
tem for taxing income, not the sub-system for taxing debt. 
Those favoting the bifurcation approach could surmount this 
problem by engaging in an analysis that replicates the justification 
for section 7872. Since Bob is obligated in year 1 to in~ur a cost of · 
$10,000 in year 6, he might be viewed as the obligor on a dis-
counted, and thus interest-bearing, loan in that amount. Under 
this view of Bob's position, it becomes appropriate to exclude from 
income the $5,640 principal amount of the interest-bearing obliga-
. tion, and to permit the further exclusion of an amount equal to the 
interest accruing annually on the principal amount. But that anal-
ogy to a discounted loan is no more valid in connection with future 
costs than it is in connection with interest-free receipts. If the obli-
gor is to be viewed as the debtor on a loan, he must also be viewed. 
as having discharged the future cost for a present payment that is 
returned to him as a discounted loan. However, that obligation 
could not be discharged in year 1 for a payment equal to the pre-
sent value of the obligation, discounted at a pre-tax interest rate. 
For example, assuming for the sake of analysis that Distributor 
would be fully subject to tax on the receipt of the $10,000 in year 
6, the after-tax net benefit to be obtained by Distributor would be 
$7,000. Therefore, if Bob desired to discharge his obligation in year 
amount from taxation - the effect associated with an improperly accelerated deduction. 
••• See supra text accompanying notes 105-6. 
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1, rather than in year 6, he could do so only by transferring $6,667 
to Distributor in that year. After being taxed on that amount, Dis-
tributor would be left with $4,667 to invest. In six years, that 
amount would grow, after current taxes, to the $7,000 that Distrib-
utor would have obtained had it waited until year 6 to receive pay-
ment. Accordingly, the present value of Bob's obligation in year 1 
is $6,667, and it would be appropriate to grant him a deduction for 
that amount in year 1. No further deduction would be granted, 
since the obligation is thereby treated for tax purposes as dis-
charged.1211 On the other hand, Bob could not discharge his obliga-
tion for a payment equal to $5,640, the pre-tax present value of the 
obligation. Accordingly, the analogy is false and it is not correct to 
view Bob as the obligor on a discounted $10,000 loan. 
Viewed differently, if Bob had discharged his obligation by a 
payment in year 1, the payee would have been subject to tax. 
Thus, the amount that could be loaned back would be the full 
amount of Bob's payment reduced by.income taxation. By treating 
Bob as obtaining a discounted loan equal to the full pre-tax 
amount of Bob's constructive payment, the bifurcation approach 
ignores one level of income taxation and would undertax obligors. 
This result is not surprising. The bifurcation of future costs is ana-
lytically identical to the bifurcation required by section 7872; both 
avoid one level of taxation and thu~ undertax borrowers. 
Because a deduction serves the same role in an income tax as an 
exclusion from income, the proper treatment of deductions is sub-
ject to the same principles that govern the treatment of receipts. 
Since obligations to discharge future costs normally do not bear a 
stated interest, the proper pattern for deducting those liabilities is 
the pattern for taxing non-interest bearing receipts. Thus, the obli-
gation should not be given any effect, for income tax purposes, un-
til it is discharged by incurring an economic detriment. In this con-
text, the judicial approach to debt- with its disregard of the time 
value of money- does not produce the correct result. The same is 
true of the congressional bifurcation approach. By contrast, the 
congressional scheme in Code section 461(h) does reach the correct 
result by using the ali-or-nothing approach to defer the tax benefit 
of future costs in response to time value of money considerations . 
... Granting Bob a $10,000 deduction in year 6 is the equivalent of granting him a $6,667 
deduction in year 1. 
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V. THE EFFECT OF NON-PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION: THE 
TAXATION OF CONVERTED TRANSACTIONS 
Not uncommonly, transactions conclude in a manner that does 
not accord with the original terms established by the parties. A 
transaction that was initiated, and properly treated for income tax 
purposes, as a loan may later be altered by the parties in a manner 
that requires treating the receipt as income and subjecting it to 
tax. That is, the receipt will have been converted from debt to in-
come. The cancellation of a traditional loan produces such a result. 
While originally taxed as a loan, the transaction will no longer be 
eligible for taxation under the sub-system for taxing debt once the 
obligation to repay is cancelled. The taxpayer thereby obtains an 
increase in net worth which must be subject to tax. A similar con-
version commonly occurs in connection with quasi-loans, such as 
the security deposits involved in Indianapolis Power, that initially 
were treated as debt. 126 Such receipts often are not repaid and thus 
are taxed to the borrower upon conversion. 
In applying the definition of debt employed by the Supreme 
Court, factors bearing on the repayment of receipts assume a criti-
cal, perhaps controlling, importance. In the Court's view, the key 
factor in determining whether to tax a receipt under the sub-sys-
tem for taxing debt or income is whether the lender or the bor-
rower controlled the repayment of the receipt.127 It has already 
been demonstrated that, ignoring the possibility of non-payment, 
the key to determining whether the receipt and possession of an 
amount should be subject to current taxation is whether the re-
ceipt is offset by an obligation that requires the actual payment of 
a market rate of interest. 128 This section addresses the impact of 
the possibility that the receipt will not be repaid. 
In designing a pattern of taxation applicable to a transaction, it 
is entirely appropriate to examine the taxation of that transac-
tion's conclusion. The overall burden of taxation imposed. is as 
much a function of the tax impos~d at this later time - whether 
the conclusion is in accord with the original terms of the transac-
tion or not - as it is a function of the initial treatment. Indeed, 
examination of the conclusion assumes special importance when a 
110 See Indianapolis Power, 110 S. Ct. at 591. 
117 See supra text accompanying notes 28-31. 
110 See supra text accompanying notes 64-95. 
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material likelihood exists that a transaction will not be concluded 
in accordance with its terms. An inadequate burden of taxation on 
the conversion of the transaction would create an obvious avenue 
for taxpayer manipulation. 
A. Converting Debt to Income 
The failure to repay the principal amount of a loan results in the 
borrower gaining cancellation of indebtedness income on the date 
he is relieved of the repayment obligation. The amount of tax im-
posed, however, is wholly unaffected by whether the borrower has 
also failed to pay interest on the loan. If the borrower has in fact 
currently paid a market rate of interest on the loan, the failure to 
repay the principal will result in a .correct burden of taxation. 
However, to the extent that the borrower is also excused from the 
making of interest payments, the tax imposed will result in the 
substantial undertaxation of the borrower. 
CASE THREE 
Carrie has borrowed $10,000 on a note that matures in six years 
and bears a market rate of interest of 10%. The proceeds of the 
note have been reinvested by Carrie, also at a 10% return. Carrie is 
subject to a marginal tax rate of 30%. 
Clarifying some aspects of this transaction will prove helpful. 
The receipt of the $10,000 will not be subject to tax if the transac-
tion is respected as a loan, because the receipt is offset by a repay-
ment obligation of equivalent value. That repayment obligation 
can be viewed as consisting of separate· obligations to pay interest 
and to repay principal. As discussed above in connection with 
Bob's obligation, the present value of the obligation to repay the 
$10,000 principal is $6,667, discounted at Carrie's after-tax rate of 
return of 7%. Thus, Carrie could invest $6,667 today and in six 
years that amount, compounded annually at her 7% net return, 
would grow by 1 V2 times to $10,000. Since the repayment of the 
principal of a loan does not have income tax consequences, that 
$10,000 would be exactly sufficient to permit repayment of the en-
tire receipt. 
In this scenario, the present value of the obligation to pay inter-
est is approximately $3,333. Since that interest payment would 
have been deductible by Carrie, her annual net burden would have 
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been 70% of the $1,000 interest payment, or $700. Thus, the pre-
sent value of the obligation to repay interest would be the present 
value of an annuity for six years of $700, or $3,333. That is, if Car-
rie had invested the $3,333 at the same 10% return, yielding 7%, 
after-tax, the investment would produce a sufficient amount to 
make a net payment of $700 (the after-tax burden of the interest 
payable on the loan) at the end of each of the next six years, at 
which time the investment would have been consumed. 
Under the conditions of Case Three, the transaction would not 
result in any economic change either before or after income taxes. 
The gain from reinvesting the proceeds would be paid in interest 
to the lender in each year and the entire receipt would be returned 
at the end of the period. Similarly, the tax on the investment re-
turn would be exactly offset by the interest deduction, and the 
borrowing and repayment would have no income tax consequences. 
By contrast, if the receipt were not offset by any repayment obliga-
tion and thus treated as taxable income when received, the $10,000 
would have been subject to a tax of $3,000, leaving $7,000 to invest. 
At the end of six years, that amount would have grown to $10,500. 
1. Failure to Repay Loan Principal 
The sub-system for taxing debt operates correctly when a tax-
payer, who has been paying interest currently at a market rate, 
fails to repay the principal amount of the loan. At that point, the 
taxpayer is subject to tax on the amount of the proceeds retained 
under the usual cancellation of indebtedness principles. For in-
come tax purposes, the transaction is viewed as if the borrower re-
ceived an economic gain equal to the amount of the debt cancelled 
and used that gain to repay the loan. In a normal commercial 
transaction, the constructive receipt would be taxable, while the 
repayment of the loan would not be deductible. 129 Thus, the net 
effect would be to subject the borrower to tax on the amount of the 
debt cancelled. 
This result appears intuitively correct because imposing such a 
tax, at that time, accurately reflects the taxpayer's change in net 
no The character and taxability of the cancellation income is a function of the nature of 
the loan and the relationship between the parties. See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness 
and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 Tax. L. Rev. 225, 235-36, 
248-53 (1959). 
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worth. Moreover, this result can be shown to be correct because 
the resulting burden of taxation is identical to the burden that 
would have been imposed had the amount not repaid been taxed 
as. income when first received. Assume, for example, that in Case 
Three Carrie pays interest currently, but at the end of year 6 the 
obligation to repay the loan is cancelled. To the extent that pro-
ceeds are permanently retained, the taxpayer should be subject to 
the same burden of taxation as would occur if the receipt had been 
treated as income when received. However, if such a retroactive tax 
could be imposed with the benefit of hindsight, it would not be 
imposed on the entire amount of the receipt. Her receipt would 
remain subject to the obligation to repay interest, which has a pre-
sent value of $3,333, and thus she should not be subject to tax on 
that amount. Rather, it would only be appropriate to tax her on 
the $6,667 difference between her $10,000 receipt and the value of 
the obligation to pay interest. That amount, of course, equals the 
present value of the obligation to repay principal which, with hind-
sight, we know will be cancelled. Thus, a proper burden of taxation 
will be imposed upon this converted transaction if it were possible 
to tax Carrie on $6,667 in year 1. However, exactly the same bur-
den of taxation will be achieved by taxing $10,000 in year 6 as by 
taxing $6,667 in year 1. 
If Carrie were taxed upon the cancellation in year 6, she would 
be subject to tax on the $10,000 proceeds retained. At her 30% tax 
rate, such a tax would leave $7,000 in her ·hands. On the other 
hand, had she been taxed in year 1 on $6,667, Carrie's 30% tax 
rate would have left her with $4,667 of that amount to invest. Over 
the six years, that amount would grow by 1 Vz times to $7,000 -
precisely the same amount as if the $10,000 amount of the loan 
were not taxed until year 6. Indeed, taxing cancellation of indebt-
edness income, when a market rate of interest is paid, is one appli-
cation of the principle that the same tax burden results from the 
taxation of an amount in the future as from the present taxation of 
the present value of that amount, discounted at an after-tax mar-
ket interest rate. 130 Because $6,667 is the present value of $10,000, 
no For an application of this principle in a different context, see Coven, Limiting Losses 
Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of the Traditional System Against the At-Risk 
Concept, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 41, 68-69 (1986). See also Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 Nat'l 
Tax J. 499 (1986). 
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discounted at Carrie's after-tax interest rate of 7% over six years, 
taxing $6,667 in year 1 is the equivalent of taxing $10,000 in year 6. 
The results just observed are largely fortuitous; they certainly do 
not indicate that the taxing system has evolved an appropriate 
method for taxing the forgiveness of the principal amount of a 
debt. Thus, for example, if in year 1 the lender forgave the repay-
ment of principal but not the payment of interest, Carrie would 
also be subject to tax on the face amount of the cancelled indebt-
edness, or $10,000. However, her receipt would remain offset by 
the present value of the obligation to pay interest. On these as-
sumed facts, Carrie would be overtaxed; her increase in wealth was 
only $6,667, not $10,000.131 Nevertheless, when interest has been 
currently paid on a receipt and the obligation to repay the receipt 
or further interest is cancelled, the borrower's accretion to wealth 
is in fact properly taxed. This fortunate result should have sub-
stantial implications for designing the taxation of the initial 
receipt. 
2. Failure to Repay Principal and Interest 
An equitable tax burden is not achieved, however, if the bor-
rower completely fails to make any repayments on the receipt. Re-
turning to Case Three, assume that Carrie not only does not repay 
the $10,000 principal amount of the receipt upon maturity, but 
also does not pay any interest over the six years. On these facts, 
Carrie has in effect converted the character of the entire receipt 
from that of a loan to taxable income. Accordingly, if it were 
known in year 1 that Carrie would not make any repayments of the 
receipt, she quite properly would have been taxed on the entire 
$10,000 in that year. In retrospect, the obligation to repay was illu-
sory; Carrie in fact obtained a $10,000 increase in her net worth in 
year 1. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that, if in fact Carrie is not sub-
ject to tax until year 6 because her failu~e to make any repayments 
181 The assumed facts are not wholly unrealistic. A borrower, such as a shareholder of the 
corporate lender, may not intend to repay the principal of a loan, but may nevertheless 
make current payments of interest, perhaps to insure that the receipt is characterized as a 
loan rather than a dividend. As indicated in the text, such a borrower should be taxed on 
the present value of the obligation to repay the principal in the year the loan is obtained, 
rather than on the full face amount of the receipt. The latter would occur under the judicial 
approach to debt. 
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was not known in year 1, the correct tax will be achieved if she is 
taxed on $15,000 in year 6. As was the case when Carrie paid inter-
est and only failed to repay loan principal, taxing $10,000 in the 
future is the equivalent of taxing $6,667 in the present, and taxing 
$15,000 in the future is the equivalent of taxing $10,000 in the 
present. 
This result, however, is not achieved under the current taxing 
system. Instead, despite the fact that Carrie has not made any pay-
ments of interest, she will nevertheless only be subject to tax on 
$10,000 in year 6. This is precisely the same burden of taxation 
that would be imposed if she had paid interest on the receipt cur-
rently and had only failed to repay the principal. In this scenario, 
Carrie might be viewed as receiving a taxable economic benefit 
from the cancellation of the obligation to pay either principal or 
interest and, constructively, using that amount to repay the 
lender. 132 However, even if Carrie were taxed on an amount equal 
to the full interest and principal cancelled, under such a recon-
struction of the transaction she would be entitled to a deduction 
for the interest constructively paid. 133 As a result, the net amount 
subject to tax on the cancellation would only equal the $10,000 
principal amount of the receipt. 
Under an income tax, failure to pay interest is logically not 
treated as gain but rather as the avoidance of loss, and thus is not 
subject to tax.134 Nevertheless, the net result of applying the sub-
system for taxing debt to unpaid interest is to substantially un-
dertax borrowers on the cancellation of their obligations to pay 
principal or interest. 
The magnitude of this flaw in the sub-system for taxing debt is 
,.. See Allan v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1988) (the principal amount of a 
mortgage, plus the unpaid interest accrued thereon, constituted the amount realized upon 
the transfer of the encumbered property to the lender in lieu of foreclosure). In Allan the 
propriety of an offsetting constructive deduction was not at issue because the accrual 
method borrower had previously deducted the interest as it accrued - deductions that were 
not challenged by the Commissioner. 
188 Under current law this result is achieved by ignoring the cancellation of indebtedness 
income produced by the cancellation of an obligation, the actual payment of which would 
have been deductible. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(2). Cf. Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and 
Transactional Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 Tax L. Rev. 473, 492 (1984). The 
Code rule was required because the judiciary generally overlooked the point. See, e.g., 
Schrott v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 981 (1989). 
, .. See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux: The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 
Proposals - Corporate Aspects, 36 Tax L. Rev. 1, 19 (1980). 
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readily apparent. Carrie would have obtained $10,000 in year 1 
without incurring any tax and thus could have reinvested that full 
pre-tax amount. At her after~tax rate of return of 7%, the $10,000 
would grow to $15,000 after six years. Upon payment.of a $3,000 
tax in year 6 on the unpaid principal amount of the loan, Carrie 
would be left with $12,000. By contrast, had the initial receipt been 
subject to tax, she would only have been able to invest the after-
tax proceeds. of the receipt, and in year 6 that amount would have 
grown to $10,500. Carrie, therefore, would gain $1,500 as the result 
of the initial characterization of her receipt as a loan, rather than 
taxable income, even though in retrospect the receipt was the eco-
nomic equivalent of income. This result is significantly more 
favorable to Carrie than the outcome produced by either the sub-
system for taxing debt or the sub-system for taxing income. 
The net result of all this is to extend to Carrie the income tax 
benefits of the sub-system for taxing debt, even though she did not 
bear the burdens that would justify that pattern of taxation. Thus, 
while she derived the benefits of the receipt of taxable income 
from the initiation of the transaction, she was able to defer the 
taxation of the receipt. Indeed, the $1,500 benefit derived by Car-
rie represents her return for investing the $3,000 tax payable on 
the receipt over the six years the transaction remained open. In 
fact, Carrie would obtain exactly the same tax preference as Bob 
would have obtained in Case Two had he not been subject to any 
tax on his interest-free receipt. This result is hardly surprising; the 
failure to pay interest is actually the equivalent of obtaining an 
interest-free loan in the first instance. 
3. Failure to Repay Bifurcated Loans 
Interest on a loan, of course, need riot be paid currently. Debt 
may be issued for an amount less than the amount to be repaid at 
maturity, in which event the element of discount represents an in-
terest factor that will be paid at maturity. 1311 When interest is not 
paid, the undertaxation of the borrower occurs regardless of 
whether the unpaid interest was payable currently or discounted. 
However, because the payments of interest on a discounted loan 
18° For a recent example of such an instrument, see Prabel v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 820, 
821 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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will not be made until the obligation to repay principal matures, 
the failure to· repay the loan inevitably will extend to interest as 
well as principal. Accordingly, upon the failure to repay a loan 
bearing discounted interest only, the borrower almost certainly will 
be undertaxed. 
Under the definition of debt adopted by Congress, if the value of 
the repayment obligation is less than the amount of the receipt, 
the transaction is bifurcated, thereby creating a discounted loan. 136 
Thus, by its terms, section 7872 produces the type of loan that will 
result in the undertaxation of borrowers if the loan is not fully re-
paid. Accordingly, applying the congressional approach to debt cre-
ates a tax avoidance opportunity. 
Case Two examined an interest-free loan which, under section 
7872, would be reconstructed as if it consisted of compensation in 
the amount of $4,360 and a discounted loan in the amount of 
$5,640. Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the section 7872 
reconstruction is correct, Bob would be properly taxed if he repaid 
the entire amount of the $10,000 receipt. However, if in year 6 the 
employer forgave the obligation to repay the ·receipt, Bob would 
not be .. properly taxed. Under general principles of taxation, Bob 
would have cancellati<;m of indebtedness income in the form of 
$10,000 in compensation. Of that amount, $5,640 would be attribu-
table to the cancellation of the obligation· to repay the principal 
amount of the loan and $4,360 would represent a recapture of the 
interest deductions previously claimed. 137 
As a result, the net amount upon which Bob would be taxed 
138 See I.R.C. § 7872(b). 
187 Under § 7872, the debt portion of the receipt is treated as a discounted loan for which 
interest must be accrued annuallY.. See I.R.C. § 163(e)(1). The failure to repay amounts for 
which a deduction has been claimed would result in income under t8x benefit principles. 
Normally it would not matter whether the amount representing interest was taxable 
under cancellation of indebtedness or tax benefit principles; the tax imposed would be the 
same. However, when the debtor's economic benefit from the cancellation would not be tax-
able, the characterization of the transaction would matter. Under tax benefit theory, the 
restoration of the prior deductions would be taxable. That would arise when a shareholder 
cancels a corporate obligation to repay principal and accrued interest. The issue has divided 
the commentators. Compare Eustice, supra note 129, at 252 (favoring the imposition of the 
tax under tax benefit theory) with Bittker & Thompson, Income From the Discharge of 
Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1159, 
1180-81 (1978) (favoring no taxation under the cancellation theory). Congress correctly de-
cided to impose the tax. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(6); S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 
n.22 (1980). 
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would be only $5,640; the cancellation of his obligation to pay in-
terest would not have any net income tax consequences. Bob would 
thereby derive a benefit from the undertaxation of his transaction 
identical to the benefit Carrie derived by failing to repay principal 
or interest in Case Three. As in Case Three, that benefit would 
equal the deferral of tax on $5,640 of the receipt over the six years 
the transaction remained open. 138 Because of this undertaxation of 
converted debt (and notwithstanding the adoption of section 
7872), Bob's employer can confer a significant after-tax economic 
benefit on him· by disguising a portion of his compensation as an 
interest-free loan.139 Because of the tax avoidance potential inher-
ent in the non-payment of discounted loans, failure to repay these 
loans should prove to be a popular technique for avoiding taxation. 
Even in the unlikely event that this strategic non-repayment 
does not occur, unplanned defaults are far more likely under sec-
tion 7872 than in the case of arm's-length commercial loans. The 
transactions subject to section 7872 are loans between related par-
ties (i.e., members of a family or shareholders in closely held cor-
porations), in which the parties~ fundamental objective is to trans-
fer an economic benefit to the borrower at a minimum income and 
transfer tax cost. The repayment of such a loan will occur only if 
repayment is consistent with the mutual income tax or estate plan-
ning objectives of the parties, and is not compelled by considera7 
tions of honest dealing or the need to maintain a sound credit rat-
ing. Since the primary purpose of the transaction is to confer an 
economic benefit upon the transferee, it can be anticipated that 
repayment quite commonly will not occur. 
Furthermore, if this bifurcation approach were to be applied to 
quasi-loan transactions (as exemplified by the deposit system in-
volved in Indianapolis Power), the likelihood of undertaxation 
would be equally great. Receipts such as security deposits and ad-
vance payments generally do not conclude in a repayment. In Indi-
anapolis Power, for example, it was conceded that over one-half of 
all deposits were applied by the customers to the payment of their 
118 Bob's benefit is actually greater than this. Because he was entitled to accrue deduc-
tions for discounted interest annually, he has in effect accelerated deductions in that 
amount in exchange for the deferred tax, upon his failure to pay interest. Thus, Bob will 
benefit from this additional tax deferral. 
110 Whether the transaction as a whole will be undertaxed is a function of the taxation of 
the other party, a topic addressed below. See infra text accompanying notes 153-72. 
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utility bills. uo Similarly, intuition suggests that most deposits 
treated as loans, such as those securing the payment of the last 
month's rental, are not actually repaid but rather are applied in 
satisfaction of the secured rental. In connection with some catego-
ries of receipts, such as advance payments for goods, the clear in-
tention of both parties to the transfer is that the receipt will not be 
repaid. 
There is, therefore, a material likelihood that non-interest bear-
ing receipts will not in fact be repaid. If these receipts have been 
characterized under the tax laws as discounted loans, failure to re-
pay will result in the undertaxation of the borrower. This aspect of 
the sub-system for taxing debt should also have substantial impli-
cations for the design of the initial taxation of the receipt. 
4. Failure to Discharge Bifurcated Future Costs 
As previously noted, 141 some have suggested that the taxation of 
obligations to incur future costs should mirror section 7872, and 
that the taxpayer should therefore be granted a series of deduc-
tions in anticipation of the actual economic outlay. In practice, of 
course, many such obligations will rtot actually be met. When this 
occurs, the transaction will have absolutely no economic conse-
quences. For example, in the deduction modification of Case Two, 
if Bob did not in fact restore the property to its original condition 
at the conclusion of the World's Fair, the anticipated future cost 
would not actually be accompanied by a change in the financial 
position of any party. 
The undertaxation that occurs when a bifurcated loan is not re-
paid is far more abusive when the obligation is attributable to in-
curring a future cost, rather than to a receipt. Under the bifurca-
tion approach to deductions, the taxpayer would have been 
entitled to deductions equalling the full face amount of the obliga-
tion prior to the deadline for discharge of the obligation. Upon the 
ultimate failure to discharge that liability, the taxpayer would of 
course be subject to a recapture tax on an amount equal to the 
deductions previously claimed. However, the combination of de-
ductions in early years and income in subsequent years results in a 
••• See supra note 20. 
••• See supra text accompanying notes 120-21. 
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material after-tax economic benefit. The taxpayer would have de-
ferred income taxes on an amount of income equal to the deduc-
tions claimed over the period of time that the transaction re-
mained open. Accordingly, in this instance the net effect of 
bifurcating future costs that are not actually incurred is to convert 
a transaction that had no pre-tax economic effect into one that 
produces an after-tax benefit. Such a negative rate of tax is plainly 
improper. 
B. Implications of the Taxation of Converted Debt 
The foregoing analysis strongly confirms the conclusions reached 
thus far concerning the taxation of the initial receipt. A correct 
burden of taxation will be achieved only if the tax rules discrimi-
nate between those receipts that are offset by obligations bearing a 
market rate of interest and those receipts that are not. 
:Whether or not the receipt is repaid, a borrower that is paying a 
market rate of interest on the obligation to repay a receipt will be 
taxed appropriately under the rules of the sub-system for taxing 
debt. Thus, in Case One, as long as Abbie actually paid the stated 
market rate of interest on her obligation, she would be properly 
taxed regardless of whether she repaid the loan or permanently re-
tained the proceeds. Accordingly, there is simply no reason to per-
mit the taxation of the initial receipt to be altered as a function of 
the likelihood of repayment. For an interest-bearing loan, factors 
concerning the repayment of the principal amount of the loan are 
wholly irrelevant to the proper taxation of the initial receipt; a cor-
rect overall taxation of the transaction is assured in either event. 
At the same time, the injection of factors bearing upon repay-
ment into the initial characterization of the receipt is not merely 
pointless. If the exclusion from income of such an interest-bearing 
receipt were successfully challenged, and the receipt recharacter-
ized as income at a time when the taxpayer remained subject to an 
obligation to pay interest, an improper burden of taxation would 
be imposed. Because the taxpayer's increase in wealth did not 
equal the full face amount of the receipt, the resulting tax would 
be excessive and the borrower would be overtaxed. 
It follows, therefore, that the definition of debt employed by the 
Supreme Court is fundamentally flawed. Drawing upon its prior 
decisions, in Indianapolis Power the Court placed extreme empha-
sis upon the taxpayer's control over the repayment of the principal 
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amount o~ the receipt, and thus upon the potential for an actual 
repayment, while discounting the significance of the payment of 
interest. That analysis is simply backward, for it is the presence of 
a market rate of interest that should be of controlling importance. 
Thus, even if it were certain in Indianapolis Power that the secur-
ity deposits would not be repaid, a proper burden of taxation 
would be achieved by imposing tax in the year that the deposit was 
converted to a payment for services and interest no longer accrued 
to the customer. 142 It is clearly a waste of administrative and judi-
cial resources to seek to characterize such a receipt as immediately 
taxable income, rather than the proceeds of a loan. 1' 3 
On the other· hand, if neither the principal nor interest on a re-
ceipt is repaid, that fact is of substantial importance to the. initial 
taxation of the receipt. Under these conditions an incorrect burden 
of taxation is produced, and the recipient will be materially un-
dertaxed. This source of undertaxation is deeply ingrained in the 
sub-system for taxing debt, and cannot be avoided under the ex-
isting income tax regime. 14' While any form of loan may result in 
the non-payment of both principal and interest, that possibility is 
most pronounced when the interest appears in the form of a dis-
,.. This assumes, as did the Court, that the interest paid was at a market rate. 
148 Evidence that interest stated on a loan might not be paid, however, would be relevant 
to the characterization of the receipt. If the borrower does not in fact intend to pay interest 
on a loan, the "loan" should be treated as non-interest bearing and fully included as income 
at the time of receipt. That inquiry, however, assumes that the payment of interest, and not 
the likelihood that the receipt's principal will be repaid, will be of paramount importance. 
••• This improper allocation of the income tax burden, resulting from the complete can-
cellation of the repayment obligation, could be eliminated by a modification of the income 
tax rules. Thus, the benefit to Carrie of the six year deferral of her tax liability could be 
eliminated by imposing a statutory interest charge on the tax arising from the cancellation 
of her loan for the period in which the loan was outstanding, but interest was not paid. 
While such an approach would be correct in principle, it does not appear to be feasible. 
A statutory interest charge would prove far more complex to design and administer than 
· might at first appear. It would only apply to the extent that the borrower had not actually 
paid a market rate of interest on the cancelled loan. Thus, the charge would have to be 
designed to take account of whatever interest was in fact paid on the loan, giving due effect 
to any tardiness in payments. Thus, the computation of such an interest charge would be 
highly complex. Secondly, it would be improper to increase the effective tax burden on the 
borrower without simultaneously decreasing the effective tax burJen on the lender. Thus, 
the imposition of a statutory interest charge on the borrower would require the making of 
an identical, and equally complex, refund of tax to the lender. However, lenders would only 
be entitled to relief to the extent that they would have been entitled to a tax benefit from 
the failure to obtain a repayment of the loan. That determination, too, would be both factu-
ally and legally complex. 
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count payable only on the maturity of the loan. Accordingly, sound 
income tax policy would be to avoid, rather than encourage, the 
creation of discounted debt. 
If it were ever appropriate to treat a receipt that is offset by a 
non-interest bearing obligation as a discounted loan, it would be 
necessary to include within the definition of debt a subjective eval-
uation of the likelihood that the debt would be repaid, a test not 
unlike that applied today by the Supreme Court. Unlike interest-
bearing receipts, ignoring the possibility of non-payment would 
create too great a potential for tax avoidance. The administration 
of such a test, however, would be difficult and uncertain. Even 
where successful, the test would not eliminate the undertaxation of 
borrowers who did not in fact repay principal or interest, even if 
they initially had intended to do so. 
A vastly superior result would be reached, however, if the taxa-
tion of receipts that are offset by non-interest bearing repayment 
obligations were not deferred at all. The conversion of debt to in-
. come through the non-repayment of tl:le receipt cannot result in 
undertaxation if either the full amount of the receipt were in-
cluded in income at the time of the initial receipt, or if the entire 
deduction for a future cost were deferred until payment. 
Following through the income tax consequences of applying the 
section 7872 approach to debt therefore confirms the conclusions 
reached above. A superior overall tax burden is achieved by the 
full inclusion of interest-free receipts in income rather than by bi-
furcating the receipt and treating a portion as a discounted loan. 
Indeed, even if it were concluded that the initial receipt would be 
as correctly taxed under the bifurcation approach as it would be 
under full inclusion, bifurcation would nevertheless be the inferior 
solution because of the tax avoidance resulting from the failure to 
repay such a receipt. 
VI. Low-INTEREST LoANS 
The discussion to this point has assumed an unrealistically po-. 
larized world in which receipts either bore a market rate of interest 
or none at all. In practice, however, a wide variety of receipts are 
offset by repayment obligations that do bear a stated rate of inter-
est. However, the stated interest often falls materially short of a 
market rate of interest. In Indianapolis Power, for example, inter-
est was only paid on deposits after they had been held for over one 
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year. 146 Thus, the effective interest paid by the taxpayer inevitably 
fell below a market rate of interest. A principal defect in the ali-or-
nothing judicial approach to debt is the inability to deal with be-
low-market obligations in a tailored fashion. Thus, regardless of 
how the receipt is characterized for tax purposes, the tax burden 
imposed will be partly right and partly wrong.146 On the other 
hand, the great advantage of the congressional approach to debt, 
with its computation of the present value of the repayment obliga-
tion, is that any stated interest will automatically affect the com-
putation of the amount that will be respected as a loan. 
Low-interest loans cannot be taxed correctly without bifurcating 
the receipt in some manner. For the same reasons as indicated 
above, the recipient of a low-interest loan would be overtaxed if 
the interest obligation were ignored and the receipt fully taxed, yet 
that same individual would be undertaxed if the inadequate inter-
est caused the entire amount of the receipt to be treated as non-
taxable.m However, the form of bifurcation adopted in section 
7872 is incorrect and does not produce a correct burden of taxation 
on the receipt. Clearly, the proper taxation of low-interest loans 
requires a different approach to bifurcation. 
It has been shown that receipts will be properly taxed if they are 
entirely excluded from income, to the extent they are offset by ob-
ligations that bear a market rate of interest. 148 Moreover, they will 
be properly taxed if they are entirely included in income, to the 
.extent they are offset by non-interest bearing obligations. For that 
purpose, only interest stated by the parties, and not interest artifi-
cially created through bifurcation, should be taken into account. If 
low-interest loans were divided into these two categories, the re-
ceipt could be taxed in accordance with the approach outlined 
here, and thus a correct tax burden could be achieved. In fact, such 
a division can be readily accomplished. 
When a receipt is offset by a repayment obligation that bears a 
below-market stated rate of interest, the amount of the receipt 
that should be treated as a loan, and excluded from income, is the 
... 110 S. Ct. at 591. 
148 The difficulty of reconciling the time value of money and the ali-or-nothing approach 
to debt troubled the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis Power. See Indianapolis Power, 857 
F.2d at 1170 n.12. 
, .. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. 
••• See. supra text accompanying notes 64-95. 
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amount for which the present value of the actual interest estab-
lished by the parties would represent a market rate of interest. By 
attributing all stated interest to the computed portion of the re-
ceipt, this portion of the receipt becomes offset by an obligation 
that bears a market rate of interest, and thus is properly excluded 
from income. Both for income tax purposes and as a reflection of 
economic reality, the balance of the receipt would continue to be 
offset by a repayment obligation. However, that obligation would 
be a non-interest bearing obligation and, under the proposals made 
here, such a receipt would be subject to taxation in full when 
received. 
The income tax consequences produced under such a revised bi-
furcation of low-interest loans are best understood through an ex-
amination of a few simple illustrations. 
Example 1. A loans $10,000 to B for six years and charges no inter-
est, although the market rate of interest would have been 10%. 
The entire amount of the receipt would be· currently taxed to B. 
Under current law, B would only be taxed on the excess of $10,000 
over the present value of $10,000 discounted at 10% over six years, 
or $4,360. 
Example 2. C loans $10,000 to D for six years, charging 6% inter-
est when a market rate would have been 10%. The actual interest 
paid, $600 annually, represents a market rate of interest on $6,000. 
Therefore, D would be currently taxed on $4,000; $6,000 of the re-
ceipt would be treated as debt. Under current law, D would only be 
taxed on the excess of $10,000 over the present value of all pay-
ment to be made, or approximately $1,744. 
Example 3. E loans F $7,384 in exchange for F's non-interest bear-
ing note for $10,000 payable in six years. Discounted interest of 
$2,616 ($10,000 minus $7,384) would be paid on a loan in the 
amount of $3,384 if a 10% market rate of interest had been 
charged. Therefore, F would be currently taxed on $4,000. Under 
current law, F would be taxed on $1,744 ($7,384 less $5,640, the 
present value of $10,000). 
Example 4. G loans H $10,000 on a demand note and charges 6% 
annual interest. If a market rate of interest were 10%, H would be 
currently taxed on $4,000; only $6,000 would be treated as a loan. 
Under current law, H would be taxed annually on the forgone in-
terest of $400 but would be permitted an interest deduction for the 
same amount. 
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This revised approach to the bifurcation of low-interest loans is 
fully consistent with the current method of taxing wholly interest-
free receipts and would impose a correct level of tax. The second 
example is a perfect illustration. On the receipt, D would be sub-
ject to a tax of 30% of $4,000, or $1,200, which would leave $8,800 
to invest. Of the $880 pre-tax return on that amount produced by 
the market rate of 10%, $600 would be required to discharge the 
deductible obligation to pay interest, leaving $280 subject to tax. 
Thus, the annual after-tax investment return to D would be $196. 
That amount is the proper after-tax return on the investment of 
the after-tax proceeds from the receipt of $4,000 in taxable in-
come.1"9 Under this approach, D would not be taxed on an amount 
sufficient to generate the funds needed to pay the actual interest 
charged on his loan ($6,000) but would be taxed on the amount of 
the receipt in excess of that principal amount. Thus, the taxation 
of D's receipt would have been properly allocated between the sub-
system for taxing income and the sub-system for taxing debt. 
In addition to producing a correct result, the results reached in 
these examples represent a substantial practical improvement over 
present law. The suggested approach to bifurcation is markedly 
simpler to apply than the extensive reconstruction required by sec-
tion 7872. The approach is also more sensible and understandable 
because it conforms far more closely to the actual economic ar-
rangement of the parties. Perhaps more importantly, by not artifi-
cially creating interest (the payment of which is deferred until ma-
turity), this approach minimizes the likelihood that interest will 
not be paid on the portion of the receipt treated as debt. As a re-
sult, this method of bifurcating low-interest loans would minimize 
the undertaxation that occurs upon failure to repay. 
Moreover, as example 4 indicates, a secondary benefit of the sug-
gested revision is the ability to treat demand and term loans alike. 
Under section 7872, demand loans are treated quite differently 
than term loans.150 Because the aggregate amount of discounted 
interest cannot be computed when the maturity of a loan is un-
known, interest for demand loans is computed on the entire 
amount of the receipt and taxed annually to the borrower. 151 One 
1
•
0 $4,000 X [1-.30) X .10 X [1-.30) = $196. 
16° Compare I.R.C. § 7872(a) with I.R.C. § 7872(b). 
161 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1). 
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result of this difference in treatment is that a materially larger ar-
tificial interest charge is created for demand loans than for term 
loans in the identical amount. 1112 This disparity constitutes a major 
conceptual flaw in section 7872. Under the proposed method of bi-
furcation, however, it is not necessary to compute the term of the 
loan. Rather, the proportion of the receipt treated as a loan is a 
function of the ratio of the stated interest to a market rate of in-
terest. Thus, demand and term loans would be taxed consistently. 
The resulting ability to conform the treatment of these two types 
of loans would represent a substantial improvement in the ration-
ality of the treatment of debt. 
VII. THE TAXATION OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION 
Imperfect taxation of transactions is not always a critical flaw. If 
the burden of taxation imposed upon one party to a transaction is 
balanced by an equal but opposite tax benefit extended to the 
other party, the imperfection in the pattern of taxation will not 
result in an incorrect level of taxation for the transaction as a 
whole. In other words, the error will not have a net revenue effect. 
Rather, the imperfection will merely shift the burden of taxation 
from one party to the other. However, in many circumstances, if 
the tax rules are known in advance, the parties will be able to ad-
just their transaction to produce the same after-tax economic con-
sequences as would have resulted under a perfect pattern of taxa-
tion.1113 When that ability is present, the marketplace will absorb 
the inequity that the imperfect pattern of taxation otherwise might 
have produced. 
When conditions allow the parties to a transaction to account for 
an imperfect pattern of taxation, modification of the tax rules may 
not be productive. The imperfection will not have a revenue effect 
and will not result in unfairness to taxpayers. On the other hand, 
amending tax rules creates both costs and risks. Rational amend-
••• The principal amount of a term loan is the present value of the payments to be made. 
Thus, it will be less than the face amount of the repayment obligation. See I.R.C. 
§ 7872(b)(1). On the other hand, the principal amount of a demand loan is the entire 
amount transferred, and annual interest on that larger amount is treated as paid annually. 
See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1). 
••• See Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules, 
44 Tax. L. Rev. 145, 164 (1989); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: 
Basic Principles Revisited, 38 Tax Notes 831, 836 (Feb. 22, 1988). 
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ments to the Code are difficult to achieve, can be highly complex, 
and may not operate properly. On balance, retaining an imperfect 
pattern of taxation that does not have major ill effects may be 
preferable to undertaking the revision of the tax rules. 
The converse, however, is also true. If the income tax conse-
quences of a pattern of taxation are not balanced by an offsetting 
impact upon another party, the tax rules will have a revenue effect. 
The transaction as a whole will be either over- or undertaxed. 
Moreover, whether the tax consequences are balanced or not, if the 
parties cannot adjust the form of their transaction to account for 
the tax system's imperfections, one or both parties will be treated 
unfairly. Under these conditions, reforming the tax rules to elimi-
nate imperfect patterns of taxation becomes necessary. 
In theory, the income tax consequences of the transactions con-
sidered in this article will normally be balanced. Under the as-
sumptions employed thus far - that both the borrower and the 
lender are subject to the same rate of tax; that all funds are in-
vested for the same return - a loan is not a revenue generating 
transaction. m The income tax burdens imposed on one party to 
the loan will be precisely offset by income tax benefits available to 
. the other party. Furthermore, this symmetrical result is not altered 
by the imperfect taxation of the borrower. described above. The 
improper taxation level of the borrower will be precisely offset by 
corresponding imperfections in the taxation of the lender. 
Case Two, for example, involved a $10,000 receipt, offset by a 
non-interest bearing repayment obligation, that matured in six 
years. This receipt should have been entirely included in Bob's in-
come when it was received. Since Bob was subject to a 30% tax 
rate, under that approach Bob would derive $7,000 from the trans-
fer and pay a tax of $3,000. However, Bob's employer would be 
entitled to an immediate deduction for the $10,000 payment. After 
reflecting its tax benefit of $3,000, the net cost to the employer of 
the payment would be the same $7,000 that Bob received, and no 
net revenue would be generated or lost by the transfer. 
It is clear that the failure to impose any tax on the $10,000 re-
ceipt in Case Two would result in the undertaxation of the recipi-
ent. However, a different tax rule would not necessarily have any 
104 See Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale L. J. 
506, 510 (1986). 
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effect upon the transaction's overall tax burden. If Bob were not to 
be taxed because the receipt was entirely treated as a loan, the 
employer would not be entitled to any deduction. As a result, the 
benefit that Bob would obtain from the deferral of tax would be 
precisely offset by the employer's burden of having to defer its own 
tax benefit. As a result of the new tax rule exempting the receipt 
from taxation, the net cost to the employer would be the full 
$10,000 of the payment. Meanwhile, Bob would obtain a full 
$10,000 economic benefit. 
It might appear that the net effect of not taxing the receipt 
would be to improperly shift the tax burden on Bob's compensa-
tion from Bob to the employer. Indeed, this effect of balanced in-
come tax rules is sometimes referred to as surrogate or substitute 
taxation. The tax properly attributable to Bob is instead paid by 
his employer. However, if the parties understand that this element 
of compensation will be ignored for income tax purposes, they can 
revise their transaction to retrieve the desired after-tax economic 
consequences. Here, for example, by reducing the amount of the 
payment to $7,000, the parties will be left in the same after-tax 
position as if the payment had been properly taxed. The em-
ployer's net after-tax expenses after the payment would be $7,000 
- precisely the amount of Bob's benefit. If the parties address the 
desired after-tax consequences of their transaction, normal market 
forces will cause the parties to make precisely that adjustment and 
the surrogate tax will be shifted from the employer back to Bob. 1115 
Under these conditions, surrogate taxation may actually play a 
positive role in the taxing system. It may be far simpler, for exam-
ple, to impose a tax on the employer (by disallowing its deduction) 
than to impose a tax on Bob. 1116 
If the instances of excessive or inadequate taxation identified 
thus far were all capable of being offset by the operation of surro-
gate taxation, reform of the tax rules would be of little conse-
quence. The statutory pattern, while defective in principle, would 
not result in an improper overall burden of taxation on the trans-
,.. One way of describing this result is to say that in selecting a tax-exempt source of 
income, Bob has subjected himself to an implicit tax of $3,000 - which reduces his net 
after-tax income to $7,000. 
'"" Compare, for example, the provisions of § 274 that disallow deductions to employers 
for untaxed benefits provided to employees. 
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action or unavoidable unfairness to a party. Thus, it would not be 
of much consequence whether the receipt was taxed fully, or not at 
all, under the judicial approach to debt, or whether it was bifur-
cated under the congressional approach. 1117 However, precisely be-
cause the transactions examined by this article contain income tax 
consequences that generally are not balanced, the propriety of the 
judicial and the congressional approaches to debt is a matter of 
concern. 
A. Sources of Imbalance 
When the tax consequences of a transfer are not balanced, the 
incorrect taxation of the recipient will not be offset by the surro-
gate taxation of the payor, and the transaction as a whole will be 
improperly taxed. Imbalance in the taxation of any transaction 
may occur for a variety of reasons, the most apparent of which is 
that the parties may not face the same effective rates of tax. 1118 The 
most significant source of imbalance, however, occurs when the 
payment, while taxable to the recipient, is not deductible by the 
payor. Returning to Case Two, under a correct pattern of taxation, 
the receipt might be fully taxed when received- producing a tax 
of $3,000. If, however, the payment of the $10,000 were not deduct-
ible by the payor at any time, the treatment of the payor would 
not offset the treatment of the recipient and the transaction would 
generate a net tax liability of $3,000. Under these circumstances, if 
the tax rules were changed and a pattern of taxation adopted that 
wholly exempted the receipt from tax, that change in the rules 
would have a revenue effect. The revenue generated by the receipt 
107 Indeed, the significance of § 7872 is confined to circumstances where the payor and 
the payee do not face the same marginal rate of tax. Thus, if the payor is a corporation and 
the non-loan portion of the payment would be recharacterized as a dividend, the payor 
would not be entitled to a deduction while the payee would have taxable income. Similarly, 
in the context of a gift loan, the payee may well be in a lower income tax bracket than the 
payor. In general, § 7872 has declined in importance under the current, less progressive 
income tax structure. 
••• This aspect of the taxing system, while not unimportant, lacks the significance today 
that it once held. Under current law, the rate structure applicable to individuals is far more 
uniform than during prior periods, and the maximum rates of tax applicable to corporations 
are roughly equivalent to the maximum rates applicable to other taxpayers. Nevertheless, 
the ever-present potential for disparities in marginal rates of tax suggests that surrogate 
taxation and market forces should not be relied upon as cures for the imperfections of the 
taxing system. 
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would have been lost through the amendment, but no offsetting 
revenue would be gained from the correlative treatment of the 
payor. Thus, under this pattern of taxation, the transaction would 
receive a $3,000 subsidy as compared to a pattern of taxation im-
posing an immediate tax upon the receipt.1119 
A payment may not be deductible for a number of different rea-
sons. A transfer from a corporation to a shareholder that is not 
respected as a loan may be a non-deductible dividend. Alterna-
tively, the payment may not be deductible because it must be capi-
talized as part of the cost of an asset with continuing value.160 
Thus, even if the payment represented compensation, the treat-
ment of the payor might not balance the treatment of the payee. 
Quite commonly, however, the payment will not· be deductible be-
cause it represents an expenditure for consumption by the payor. 
This was the situation in Indianapolis Power. While the utility re-
cipient in that case was, of course, subject to tax on all payments 
received for providing power, the primarily non-business customers 
required to make deposits with the utility were not entitled to in-
come tax deductions for the payments they made. As a result, the 
income tax treatment of the customers did not :vary with the char-
acterization of the transaction. Thus, any undertaxation of the re-. 
ceipt by the utility would not be offset by the surrogate overtaxa-
tion of the customers. 
Because of the wide range of circumstances in which the treat-
ment of the recipient is not balanced by the treatment of the 
payor, reliance upon surrogate taxation to eliminate the overall un-
dertaxation of transactions is generally unsound. In the context of 
interest-free receipts, however, surrogate taxation is particularly 
inappropriate. Non-interest bearing receipts are not random com-
mercial transactions, but instead represent deliberate steps taken 
by the parties to provide a particular form of economic benefit to 
the payee. This may occur either because such a benefit ·is mutu-
ally intended, as exemplified by an interest-free loan between re-
lated parties, or it may be coerced by the economic power of one 
100 This subsidy may be shared by the parties. If, for example, only $8,500 were trans-
ferred, the net cost of the payment to the payor WQuld be less, and the net benefit from the 
payment to the recipient would be greater, than the costs and benefits resulting from a 
correct pattern of taxation. 
••• See I.R.C. § 263. See also Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974). 
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party, as occurred in Indianapolis Power. In these contexts, in-
come tax consequences are particularly susceptible to taxpayer ma-
nipulation. If the recipien~s of interest-free loans are undertaxed, 
this method of transferring an economic benefit would be selected 
by the parties when surrogate taxation did not eliminate all of the 
tax benefit from the arrangement. Significantly, most of the quasi-
loan cases to come before the Supreme Court involved non-deduct-
ible consumption expenditures by the payors of the receipts for 
which exclusion was sought. 161 In these instances, surrogate taxa-
tion would not work at all. 
B. Deductible Obligations 
Balanced income tax consequences are no less significant when 
the obligation is not attributable to a receipt but instead repre-
sents a future cost.162 If the income tax consequences of the trans-
action are not balanced and the obligor is undertaxed, the transac-
tion as a whole will be improperly undertaxed. 163 In the context of 
181 See Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 595 (gambling); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 
128, 130 (1963) (dancing lessons); American Automobile, 367 U.S. at 688 (automobile club). 
101 Recalling the modification of Case Two, in year 1 Bob incurred a deductible obligation 
to make a payment of $10,000 in year 6. On these facts it was observed that Bob would be 
correctly taxed if his deduction of the full $10,000 were deferred to year 6, as required by 
§ 461(h). In that event, the transfer would be revenue-neutral if Distributor, the other party 
to the transaction, were required to report the full $10,000 payment in the same year 6. 
However, the transaction would also be revenue-neutral if Bob were entitled to claim his 
deduction in year 1, provided that the Distributor was also required to report the payment 
in year 1. Of course, under that pattern of taxation, Bob would be undertaxed by the value 
of the accelerated deduction, but the employer would be overtaxed by the same amount. 
As in the case of a receipt, if the income tax consequences were known beforehand, the 
parties could account for the imperfection in the pattern of taxation. The after-tax cost of a 
payment of $10,000 in year 6, deductible at that time, would be $7,000 and the present value 
of that amount would be $4,667. Similarly, the year 1 present value of the after-tax benefit 
to the Distributor of a $10,000 taxable payment in year 6 would be the same $4,667. If 
instead the payment were deductible in year 1, although still not made until year 6, that 
pattern of taxation would benefit the payor while equally burdening the recipient. However, 
the surrogate taxation of the recipient would be shifted back to the payor if the amount of 
the payment were increased to $12,716. The present v8Iue of a payment in year 6 of that 
amount, less the benefit of a deduction in year 1 for that amount, would equal the net cost 
of $4,667 that Bob would incur, and the net benefit that Distributor would obtain, under a 
correct pattern of taxation. 
108 See Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44 
Tax Notes 1531, 1532-37 (Sept. 25, 1989) (arguing that the bifurcation approach to future 
costs is correct and that section 461(h) represents a debatable surrogate taxation of 
obligors). 
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future costs, the transaction will be undertaxed if a current tax 
cannot be imposed upon the recipient in the same period for which 
a deduction is extended to the obligor.164. Because in practice such 
an inclusion in income cannot be achieved, any approach to future 
costs that permitted a deduction in advance of payment would 
often result in an imbalanced pattern of taxation. 
First, a tax may not be imposed upon a recipient until the recipi-
ent can be identified. Thus, for example, Bob might have had an 
obligation to restore his own land following a strip mining opera-
tion. The ultimate beneficiary of that cost would be the general 
public, but the public will not be taxed at any time on its genera-
lized increase in well-being. Bob might hire a contractor to accom· 
plish the restoration and a surrogate tax might be imposed upon 
that contractor. However, until the contractor is identified and 
hired (most likely in year 6), no such tax can be imposed. As a 
result, in a wide range of circumstances, recipients cannot be taxed 
prior to the actual discharge of the future obligation.1611 
Second, even where the recipient can be readily identified, the 
imposition of an offsetting tax liability may not be permissible 
under one of the Code rules that defers or exempts the income 
from tax. On the modified facts of Case Two, for example, Distrib-
utor would not derive taxable income from the return of its prop-
erty in a restored condition - a result that is not unsound. 166 
More generally, one Code rule that would prevent the surr~gate 
taxation of payees is the cash method of accounting.167 U~der this 
method of accounting, an identified and fully taxabie recipient 
would not be required to include any amount in income prior to an 
actual payment. Thus, conforming inclusions in income to deduc-
184 Professor Halperin has observed that a correct burden of taxation can be achieved in 
the absence of temporal matching of income and deduction if the deduction is limited to the 
present value, using an after-tax rate of interest, of the future cost, while the recipient is 
taxed on the future value of that amount. See Halperin, supra note 154, at 520-23. In the 
example used in the text, the transaction would be correctly taxed if Bob was entitled to a 
deduction for $6,667 in year 1 and Distributor was required to report income of $10,000 in 
year 6. That treatment would be correct because taxing the Distributor on $10,000 in year 6 
is the equivalent of taxing it on $6,667 in year 1. However, when the amount deducted and 
the amount reflected in income are identical, a correct tax result is only achieved if the 
items are reflected in the same year. 
••• See Cunningham, supra note 116, at 614-15. 
••• See I.R.C. § 109. Under these circumstances, it is not at all clear that Distributor 
would have derived a gain. 
187 See I.R.C. § 446(c). 
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tions in advance of payment would require the virtual repeal of the 
cash method of accounting. In short, any attempt to implement the 
taxation of recipients in advance of an actual payment would re-
quire an extensive modification of otherwise entirely sound rules of 
the Code. 168 
In these circumstances, surrogate taxation cannot justify the ac-
celeration of a deduction for future costs. Indeed, the need for ac-
curately timing the deduction of a future cost is greater than the 
need for the accurate taxation of receipts. This is so because the 
inability to impose offsetting treatment upon payees is attributable 
to insurmountable factual as well as legal obstacles. Accordingly, to 
prevent an improper subsidy, the tax benefit attributable to an ob-
. ligation .to incur a future cost inust be deferred until the obligor 
sustains a present economic detriment. 
C. Converted Transactions 
If a market rate of interest has been paid on a loan for which the 
principal has not been repaid, the conversion to income will be cor-
rectly taxed without regard to surrogate taxation. However, if 
neither principal nor interest is repaid, the borrower will be un-
dertaxed. In a normal lending transaction, the undertaxation of the 
borrower upon the cancellation of debt will be balanced by the 
treatment of the lender. Thus, in Case Three, if Carrie made no 
repayments of principal or interest on her receipt, she would only 
be sub]ect to a net tax on $10,000 in year 6. That level of taxation 
is inadequate because, ideally, Carrie should be subject to a burden 
of taxation equivalent to imposing a tax on the $10,000 receipt in 
year 1 plus imposing an interest charge for deferring payment of 
that tax until year 6. However, that undertaxation would be hal-
••• Allowing obligors to claim a series of deductions in advance of an actual payment, 
under the bifurcation approach, would pose the serious problem of excessive complexity. 
Both the obligor and the recipient would be required to reflect their transaction over a 
period of years pursuant to a complex formula. In one specific instance, Congress has re-
quired just such a result. Under § 467 of the Code, when certain large rental payments are 
deferred beyond the year of use, the amount treated as rent is reconstructed under § 7872 
principles. Thus, the amount treated as rent is the present value of the payment obligation, 
and that amount is both deductible and taxable in the year of usage. The difference be-
tween that present value and the face amount of the obligation is treated as interest that 
both parties must reflect annually over the period during which payment is deferred. Exam-
ination of § 467 reveals that it is far too complex to be applied to a much broader range of 
transactions. 
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anced by the overtaxation of the lender. In year 6 the lender would 
only receive a bad debt loss of the same $10,000 upon which Carrie 
was actually taxed.169 Under the logic of the taxing system, the 
lender would not be entitled to any tax benefit attributable to his 
failure to collect interest during the outstanding period of the loan. 
This failure to collect income relieves the taxpayer from any tax on 
the uncollected amount, but does not produce any further income 
tax benefit. 
In retrospect, however, it may be seen that the lender has been 
left in the same economic position as if he had sustained a loss in 
year 1 and, from that perspective, has suffered from deferring his 
loss over the six year period. Ideally, the lender should be entitled 
to a benefit equivalent to the value of deducting the loss in year 1 
and rec~iving interest on the deferral of the tax benefit to year 6. 
This would correspond to the ideal burden on Carrie. Under pre-
sent law, however, the receipt of a lesser loss precisely offsets the 
benefit derived by Carrie from deferring her tax burden for the 
same period of time. Thus, as in the case of the imperfect taxation 
of the initial receipt, the imperfect taxation of the cancellation of 
the indebtedness may have no revenue effect. Rather, this aspect 
of the sub-system for taxing debt may only result in the undertax-
ation of the recipient and the corresponding overtaxation of 
lenders. 170 
The balance in the taxation of a debt cancellation, however, will 
be upset if the lender is not entitled to a loss upon the failure to 
repay. If the lender's loss is not deductible regardless of the treat-
ment of the borrower, the undertaxation of the borrower will not 
be offset by the overtaxation of the lender. As a result, taxing the 
180 As a statutory matter, this result is required by § 166(b), which limits the loss to the 
taxpayer's tax basis in the debt. In general, that basis would be the principal amount that 
was loaned. See I.R.C. § 1012. 
••• There is, however, an important difference between the imperfect taxation of the ini· 
tial receipt and the imperfect taxation of the conversion of a transaction. Even if Carrie and 
her lender knew how the income tax rules would apply to their transaction, they could not 
adjust their transaction to allow for those rules because they would not know at the incep-
tion of the loan that it would not be repaid. As a result, the element of unfairness created by 
the imperfect taxation of converted transactions cannot be eliminated by private action. 
The parties could, of course, provide in their original loan agreement that upon a default in 
repayment, damages in the amount of the tax benefit obtained by the borrower would be 
paid to the lender. However, since by hypothesis the borrower has failed to repay the princi-
pal of the loan, it seems unlikely that such a provision would be fruitful. 
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cancellation of both principal and interest repayments will trans-
late into an improper revenue loss. For example, the loan to Carrie 
in Case Three might have been made by a corporation in which she 
was a principal stockholder. In this scenario, the failure of repay-
ment might be treated as a dividend, taxable to her but non-de-
ductible by the corporate "lender:" Under these conditions, the 
undertaxation of Carrie will not be offset by the overtaxation of 
the lender; the lender is merely deprived of a deduction that it 
could not have claimed in any event. 171 Accordingly, the undertax-
ation of borrowers who do not pay interest on cancelled loans re-
sults in a subsidy to taxpayers, as well as a material revenue loss if 
the lender is not entitled to deduct his failure to collect the 
amount of the loan. 
A situation in which a lender could not deduct the loss produced 
by a failure of repayment would, of course, parallel the circum-
stances in which the payor would not be able to deduct the initial 
payment. In Indianapolis Power, for example, most of the deposits 
were not repaid, but instead were applied towards the customer's 
electric bill. 172 Had those deposits been treated as the proceeds of a 
loan despite earning no interest, the conversion of the deposit 
would have been taxable to the utility at the time of conversion -
thereby undertaxing the utility. However, the non-business deposi-
tors would not have been entitled to any deduction with respect to 
their payments, regardless of the treatment of the utility. Thus, 
the undertaxation of the utility would not have been offset by the 
overtaxation of the customers, and the pattern for taxing the 
transactions would have generated an improper revenue loss. 
A similarly troublesome revenue loss accompanies the operation 
171 Under an ideal pattern of taxation, Carrie would be subject to a tax on the receipt and 
would be required to pay interest on the deferral of the payment of that tax for six years. 
However, the corporate lender would not be entitled to any deduction and thus would not 
be entitled to any interest on the deferral of that deduction. Thus, under an ideal pattern of 
taxation, the net revenue generated by the complete cancellation of the loan would exceed 
the tax levied on $10,000 by the amount of the interest paid on that tax. 
Under current law, however, Carrie would only be subject to a tax on $10,000 in year 6, 
and would owe no tax attributable to the cancellation of the obligation to pay interest. 
Thus, as compared to an ideal pattern of taxation, the net tax paid on the cancellation is 
less than the correct amount of tax by an amount equal to the interest on the deferred tax 
liability. Since, by hypothesis, the cancellation does not have any income tax consequence to 
the lender, the undertaxation of the borrower is not offset by the overtaxation of the lender. 
171 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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of section 7872 of the Code. Under the bifurcation approach 
adopted by that section, a form of discounted debt is created and a 
failure of repayment is likely to extend to interest as well as princi-
pal. If that failure of repayment occurs, the borrower, as has been 
seen, will be undertaxed. To the extent that the payor would not 
be entitled to a current deduction for the transfer (or would be 
entitled to a tax benefit of lesser magnitude than the tax imposed 
upon the recipient), that undertaxation of the borrower will result 
in the undertaxation of the transaction as a whole. This will always 
be the result, for .example, with respect to the dividend resulting 
from a shareholder's failure to repay a loan from a corporation. To 
the extent that such loans to shareholders are not in fact repaid, 
which in all likelihood is a common occurrence, the bifurcation ap-
proach of section 7872 will not achieve the proper level of taxation 
for the transaction as a whole. 
Just as surrogate taxation cannot be relied upon in the taxation 
of receipts, it cannot be relied upon to correct the taxation of the 
conversion of non-interest bearing debt to income. The systematic 
undertaxation of discounted debt cancellations too often will not 
be offset by the overtaxation of lenders. Indeed, a correct level of 
taxation on interest-free receipts can only be achieved through the 
avoidance of discounted debt and the taxation of the entire receipt 
when it is obtained. 
VIII. CoNSISTENCY CoNSIDERATIONS: CoNVERTING INcOME To 
DEBT 
If a taxpayer obtains a receipt that, at the end of the taxable 
year, appears not to be subject to an obligation to repay, the pro-
ceeds will be taxed in the year of receipt. If the taxpayer later be-
comes obligated to return the receipt and does so, he will then be 
entitled to a tax deduction in the later year of repayment. 173 The 
annual accounting system has always been interpreted to prevent 
reopening the earlier return and claiming the loss against the ini-
tial return of income.174 
Returned receipts, however, are economically identical to loans: 
171 See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1951). 
,.. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1931). The notion persists, 
however, that reopening the initial return would be a superior solution. See Hillsboro Nat'l 
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 425-26 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the taxpayer has obtained value, invested it over a period of years, 
and returned the original receipt - perhaps along with interest 
computed on the principal amount. Ideally, therefore, the burden 
of taxation imposed upon a returned receipt should be identical to 
the burden imposed upon debt. Under present law, however, con-
verted income transactions are subject to a pattern of taxation that 
is vastly different from that applicable to debt. 
CASE FOUR 
Pursuant to its established bonus compensation plan, at the end of 
the year Employer pays Don $10,000. A later review of Don's per-
. formance for that year discloses that he was not entitled to any 
bonus at all. Six years after the initial receipt, Don returns the 
$10,000 to Employer. Both Don and Employer are subject to a 30% 
rate of tax. Don paid a tax of $3,000 on the bonus and invested the 
balance, obtaining a 10% pre-tax return. 
In year 6, if Don not only returned the $10,000 but also paid 
10% interest on that amount, he will be seriously overtaxed. Over 
the six years, his investment will have grown to $10,500 at his af-
ter-tax rate of return of 7%. However, the obligation to repay the 
receipt with interest will amount to $17,700. The tax benefit from 
deducting that entire amount will be $5,310, producing a net cost 
of repayment of $12,390. As a result, Don will be required to repay 
$1,890 more than he derived from the transaction and thus will 
incur a net economic loss in that amount. 
· This result is not at all surprising. Don was only able to invest 
the after-tax proceeds of his bonus, yet was required to pay inter-
est on the pre-tax amount. In Case One, Abbie received similar 
treatment as a result of her including as income all the proceeds of 
an interest-bearing loan. In Abbie's case, taxation converted a 
transaction that produced an economic wash into one that pro-
duced an after-tax economic loss, because the imposition of tax im-
properly prevented Abbie from funding the obligation to pay inter-
est. For precisely the same reason, imposing the same burden of 
taxation on Don would be improper.175 
170 Since Don cannot be helped by revising the definition of debt, his problem, while seri-
ous, is not further addressed here. The appropriate relief for Don would be the ability to 
carry his loss back to year 1 and obtain interest on the refund of the tax paid in that year. 
Under current law, however, Don's only relief is the ability to elect, under § 1341, between 
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If Don were not required to pay interest on the repayment of his 
bonus compensation, however, his transaction would resemble not 
Abbie's but Bob's. Upon repayment of the receipt, Don would be 
in the same position economically as a taxpayer who obtained and 
repaid an interest-free loan. Viewing the transaction in retrospect,. 
Don received the equivalent of an interest-free loan maturing in 
six years, and thus should be subject to the same pattern of taxa-
tion used for the recipients of interest-free loans. Under section 
7872 of the Code, such a loan would be bifurcated and partially 
taxed upon receipt. 
In Case Four, however, this option would not be available in 
practice. Since it was not known in year 1 that the receipt would 
have to be repaid, it would be impossible to apply the section 7872 
bifurcation approach to Don on the initial receipt. Thus, if bifurca-
tion were to be applied, it would have to be done retroactively, in a 
later year in which repayment would be required. Implementing 
such an approach would require computing in year 6 the amount 
that should have been treated as a loan in year 1, and granting the 
taxpayer a refund of the tax paid on that amount, with interest 
over the six years. While possible in principle, such an approach to 
the taxation of returned income would not appear to be feasib~e in 
practice. The computation of tax liability would be complex - and 
excessively so, given the relative simplicity of the transaction sub-
ject to tax. 176 Moreover, granting a tax refund with interest would 
be significantly more advantageous to taxpayers than a mere de-
duction, thus creating incentives for taxpayer manipulation. As a 
result, applying the bifurcation approach to the taxation of re-
turned income simply is not a viable option. The only practical 
pattern of taxation would involve subjecting the receipt to current 
taxation in full and allowing Don a deduction for any amount actu-
ally repaid in the year of repayment. 
claiming a tax credit or a deduction for his repayment. 
118 If it were possible to bifurcate such a receipt retroactively as to the recipient, thereby 
reducing his income tax liability, it would also be necessary to increase retroactively the 
payor's level of taxation. To the extent that the receipt was treated as a non-taxable loan to 
the recipient, it would have to be treated as a non-deductible loan by the payor. That treat-
ment of the payor, while entirely correct in principle, would not be sound in practice. In 
addition to the actual harshness of the imposition of such a tax, the retroactive loss of a 
deduction would be perceived as a wholly unfair price for demanding the repayment of an 
amount mistakenly transferred to an employee or other payee. · 
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For the reasons detailed above, treating returned income in this 
manner is entirely appropriate. The net effect of applying this pat-
tern of taxation to Don would be to subject him to the rules of the 
sub-system for taxing income over the six years during which he 
retained the bonus. Since Don was not required to pay interest on 
the receipt, and thus was entitled to retain the full return from his 
investment, he derived the economic benefits of income and was 
not subject to ariy of the economic burdens of debt. Accordingly, 
his receipt ought to be subject to the rules of the sub-system for 
taxing income, not the sub-system for taxing debt. The deduction 
allowed upon the ultimate repayment of the previously taxed in-
come adequately compensates him for the initial overtaxation. 
Subjecting Don's receipt to immediate taxation in full is, of 
course, the result reached under present law. However, this treat-
ment of returned income is sharply inconsistent with section 7872's 
bifurcation approach to economically identical receipts of interest-
free loans. Such a major inconsistency is undesirable in any taxing 
system, and should be avoided whenever possible. Accordingly, the 
treatment of Don's returned income strongly reinforces the conclu-
sion that Bob's interest-free loan should also be subject to immedi-
ate taxation, and should not be bifurcated under section 7872 of 
the Code. The complex reconstruction mandated by that provision 
is simply inconsistent with other appropriate and long-standing 
rules of-the taxing system. 
IX. CoNCLUSION: A PROPER DEFINITION oF DEBT 
Characterizing a receipt as a loan, or in the nature of a loan, 
· means that the receipt will be subject to the specialized rules of 
the sub-system for taxing debt. Of those rules, the most dramatic 
is the total exclusion from taxable income accorded to the proceeds 
of a loan. That exclusion, however, is not intended as a tax subsidy 
for borrowing; it is extended because it is wrong to impose tax on 
an amount that does not represent an increase in net worth. Di-
minishing such a receipt through taxation would deprive the recip-
ient of the ability to fund the obligation to pay interest on the 
receipt, and thus would convert an economically neutral transac-
tion into one yielding an after-tax economic loss. 
On the other hand, the failure to impose a tax on a receipt that 
does represent an increase in net worth is also improper. In this 
situation, the recipient is able to invest pre-tax funds for his or her 
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own account and thus can obtain a greater after-tax return than a 
taxpayer who had been subject to the normal operation of the in-
come tax. Relative to normally taxed receipts, untaxed receipts are 
preferential and, under an ideal income tax system, improper. 
In determining whether a receipt represents an increase in net 
worth, and the extent of that increase, the repayment obligation 
must be valued by taking into account the time value of money. 
The failure to do so would treat a receipt upon which a market 
rate of interest must be paid as equivalent in value to a receipt 
upon which no interest must be paid. This is an "equivalence" that 
plainly does not exist. The non-interest bearing receipt generates a 
return that may be retained by the taxpayer, while the interest-
bearing receipt generates no such return and thus is of substan-
tially lesser value. On the one hand, disregarding the value of an 
interest-free receipt avoids one of the levels of tax imposed by an 
income tax, and thus improperly subsidizes interest-free receipts. 
On the other hand, disregarding the lack of value in an interest-
bearing receipt imposes a tax in the absence of gain and thus ex-
cessively taxes interest-bearing obligations. 
In a wide range of contexts, the courts have been willing to en-
tertain, and sometimes accept, a variety of arguments leading to-
wards the exemption from current taxation of non-interest bearing 
receipts.177 It has been demonstrated here that in every context, 
that result is improper. To achieve a correct allocation of th'e tax 
burden, all interest-free receipts - whether in the form of loans, 
advance payments, or deductions for future costs - must be sub-
ject to taxation in full when the receipt is obtained. In other con-
texts, the courts have been willing to entertain the argument that a 
receipt bearing a market rate of interest that was actually. paid 
should nevertheless be fully subject to tax. 178 It has also been 
demonstrated here that such a tax would improperly overtax 
recipients. 
To secure a correct level of taxation on receipts that are offset 
by obligations of any sort, the Supreme Court must learn to appre-
ciate the significance of the time value of money, while simultane-
ously ending its reliance on control over the principal amount 
117 See, e.g., Cohen v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1990); Crown v. Commis-
sioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978). 
178 See, e.g., Mason v. U.S., 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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transferred. Such an economically irrelevant issue should not be 
the lynchpin of decisions over whether to exclude a receipt from 
income because of an offsetting obligation. Rather, the pattern of 
taxation provided by the sub-system for taxing debt must be re-
served for receipts that are offset by obligations that actually bear 
a market rate of interest that the borrower intends to pay in good 
faith. 179 Moreover, since the conversion of a loan to income is cor-
rectly taxed if a market rate of interest has been paid on the re-
ceipt, that exclusion should not be affected by the probability that 
the principal amount of the receipt will actually be repaid. Since 
income is a question of value, not control, exclusion simply should 
not be affected by the degree to which the borrower or the lender 
controls repayment. 
Because of the inadequacies contained in the judicial definition 
of debt, Congress adopted an alternative definition based upon the 
time value of money. That definition, however, was derived from 
an earlier effort to identify an element of interest that was as-
sumed to exist. As a result, an interest-free receipt was converted 
into an interest-bearing receipt that was exempt from tax. The ef-
fect of this exemption has been to permit the investment of a pre-
tax receipt - clearly an improper result. 
While the congressional approach represents a substantial im-
provement over the judicial approach to the definition of debt, it 
also fails to produce a correct result. The artificial creation of in-
terest does not properly implement time value of money principles. 
Unless interest is actually paid on a receipt, the receipt should not 
be treated as debt, and the entire amount of the receipt should be 
subject to immediate taxation in full. In that respect, the ali-or-
nothing feature of the traditional judicial approach to debt 
emerges as entirely correct. 
It would not be difficult for Congress and the judiciary to imple-
110 Nothing in this proposed scheme is intended to require treating any form of obligation 
as debt, for income tax purposes, if the borrower lacks a bona fide intention to repay the 
loan. For example, if a controlling shareholder of a closely-held corporation that does not 
pay dividends forces the corporation to grant him loans, and the surrounding circumstances 
suggest that the loans will not be repaid, the cash transfer might appropriately be treated as 
a dividend - both under present law as well as in the proposals outlined in this article. 
Similarly, an obligation need not be treated as an interest-bearing obligation unless the 
borrower has a bona fide intention to pay the interest stated. Absent that intention, the 
obligation to pay interest is worthless and should be disregarded. 
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ment the reforms advocated in this article. Indeed, the proposals 
presented here would greatly simplify and rationalize both the tax-
ation of low-interest loans and a wide range of classification issues 
that have recurred with frequency. As a result, a more correct and 
consistent allocation of the tax burden could be achieved, along 
with a reduction in. the frequency of many income tax 
controversies. 
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APPENDIX - CASE ILLUSTRATIONS 
CASE ONE 
Abbie, a key employee of Distributor, Inc., has obtained a $10,000 
loan from Distributor, giving in exchange her personal note. The 
note matures in six years and bears interest at a market rate of 
10%, payable annually. However, at Abbie's option, the note can at 
any time be applied to reduce outstanding accounts receivable due 
Abbie for the Distributor's purchase of goods from her. Both Abbie 
and Distributor are subject to a marginal rate of tax of 30%, and 
both can earn a 10% pre-tax return on their investments. 
CASE TWO 
Like Abbie, Bob is employed by Distributor and obtains a $10,000 
loan from his employer. The note given by Bob in exchange for the 
loan also matures in six years but does not bear any stated interest. 
Bob is also subject to a marginal tax rate of 30% and can earn a 
10% pre-tax return on his investments. 
CASE TWO (DEDUCTION) 
Distributor allows Bob to use its real property as a site for a 
World's Fair, but on the condition that at the conclusion of the 
Fair, Bob will restore the site to its original condition. Restoration 
will occur in six years and can be predicted to cost $10,000. Bob 
remains subject to a 30% rate of tax and can earn a pre-tax return 
of 10% on his investments. 
CASE THREE 
Carrie has borrowed $10,000 on a note that matures in six years 
and bears a market rate of interest of 10%. The proceeds of the 
note have been reinvested by Carrie, also at a 10% return. Carrie is 
subject to a marginal tax rate of 30%. 
CASE FOUR 
Pursuant to its established bonus compensation plan, at the end of 
the year Employer pays Don $10,000. A later review of Dan's per-
formance for that year discloses that he was not entitled to any 
bonus at all. Six years after the initial receipt, Don returns the 
$10,000 to Employer. Both Don and Employer are subject to a 30%. 
rate of tax. Don paid a tax of $3,000 on the bonus and invested the 
balance, obtaining a 10% pre-tax return. 

